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A TALE OF Two ISLANDS: COMPARATIVE
REFLECTIONS ON CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
HONG KONG AND TAIWAN
0
Albert H.Y. Chen*
Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have been major sites of constitutional experimentation
in East Asia in the last two decades. Constitutionalism is characterised by the rule of
law and of the constitution, separation of powers and judicial independence, and the
constitutional protection of human rights. It subjects political power to legal control,
and enables peaceful transfer of political power in accordance with electoral rules of
the game. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have made significant progress in developing
constitutionalism since the 1980s. This article compares the records of these two
"islands" (territories) in this regard, and explore the future of a constitutionalism
rooted in Chinese culture and society. It concludes that the constitutional projects in
both Hong Kong and Taiwan are still works in progress that await completion.
1. Introduction
Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have been major sites of constitutional experi-
mentation in East Asia in the last two decades.! In the case of Hong Kong,
the constitutional experiment was based on the concept of "one country, two
systems", which was originally invented by senior Chinese statesman Deng
* LLB, PCLL (HKU), LLM (Harvard); Solicitor (HK); Chan Professor in Constitutional Law, Faculty
of Law, University of Hong Kong. This article was first presented at the 6th Eastern Asia Conference
on the Philosophy of Law organised by the Law School, National Taiwan University, Taipei on 26
and 27 March 2006. The author is grateful to Professor Dennis Te-chung Tang (of the Institutum
lurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taipei) and Professor Chang Wen-chen (of the Law School, Na-
tional Taiwan University, Taipei) for their support during the preparation of this article. The author
would also like to thank Professor Tang, Professor Tom Ginsburg (of the College of Law, University
of Illinois), Professor Chen Hsin-min (of the Institutum lurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taipei)
and Nigel Nianzu Li, who kindly drew the author's attention to some relevant sources; Nigel Li also
kindly commented on a draft of this article; Professor Chang kindly supplied to the author a copy of
her doctoral dissertation on Transition to Democracy, Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism: Taiwan in
Comparative Constitutional Perspective (JSD dissertation, Yale Law School, 2001). The author is grate-
ful to his research assistant, Lee To Ching Ken, for assistance in the preparation of the footnotes of
this article. For the Chinese version of this article in which additional source materials in Chinese
are referred to, see Academia Sinica Law Journal ( inaugural issue (2007), p 75.
1 Democratisation in South and South-East Asian countries can be understood as part of what
Huntington described as "The Third Wave of Democratization"; see Samuel P. Huntington, The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991); Larry Diamond and Marc E Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Demo-
cracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Dennis Austin (ed), Liberal Democracy in
Non-Western States (St. Paul: Professors World Peace Academy, 1995).
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Xiaoping in the late 1970s2 to entice Taiwan into re-unification with main-
land China. In the event, the concept proved to be totally unattractive to
Taiwan3 but was actually implemented in Hong Kong, a British colony which
Britain in 1984 promised to return to the People's Republic of China (PRC)
in 1997.4
Under colonial rule, a kind of benign authoritarianism was practiced in
Hong Kong. Political power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor
appointed by London, with all members of the legislature appointed by the
Governor. At the same time, the English tradition of the common law and of
judicial independence was transplanted to the colony. A reasonable degree of
civil liberty was recognised, particularly after the riots of the 1960s subsided.'
Like Hong Kong, Taiwan also formed part of the Qing Empire in China
before it was ceded to a foreign power. Whereas the island of Hong Kong was
ceded to Britain in 1842 after China's defeat in the Opium War, the island of
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after China's defeat in the First Sino-
Japanese War. Hong Kong was also occupied by Japan during the Pacific War,
but British colonial rule resumed immediately thereafter. Japanese colonial
rule in Taiwan ended in 1945 with Japan's defeat in the Second World War.
The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Government of the Republic of China
(ROC) established its rule over Taiwan.6 After the establishment of the PRC
in the Chinese mainland in 1949, Taiwan constituted the only remaining
territory of the ROC. One-party authoritarian governance was practiced in
Taiwan for four decades. A limited degree of rule by martial law was imposed.
Although a constitutional court existed in the form of the Council of Grand
Justices, it did not play any significant role. As of the 1970s, the human rights
record in Taiwan was poorer than that in Hong Kong. But economically, both
Hong Kong and Taiwan prospered as two of the "Four Little Dragons" of East
Asia.'
2 See Deng Xiaoping on "One Country, Two Systems" (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2004); Albert H.Y.
Chen, "The Concept of 'One Country, Two Systems' and its Application to Hong Kong", in
C. Stephen Hsu (ed), Understanding China's Legal System (New York: New York University Press,
2003), Ch 9.
3 See Ying-jeou Ma, "Policy Towards the Chinese Mainland: Taipei's View", in Steve Tsang (ed), In the
Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1993), Ch 8.
4 Macau, a Portuguese colony neighbouring Hong Kong, was also returned to the PRC in 1999 under
the framework of "one country, two systems".
5 For the history of Hong Kong, see G.B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 2nd edn 1964); G.B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962: A
Constitutional History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964); Frank Welsh, A History of
Hong Kong (London: HarperCollins, 1993); Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
6 For the history of Taiwan, see Murray A. Rubinstein (ed), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk, New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview
Press, 3rd edn 1999); Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003);
Ito Kiyoshi, History of Taiwan (Taipei: Qianwei Press, 2004) (English-Chinese bilingual edition).
7 See Ezra E Vogel, The Four Little Dragons (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991).
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 648 2007
Constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan 649
The 1980s saw the beginnings of liberalisation and democratisation in
both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Elected members were introduced into the
Legislative Council of Hong Kong for the first time in 1985.8 In Taiwan, Chiang
Ching-kuo lifted the martial law in 1987. More civil liberties were allowed,
civil society flourished, and the opposition party - the Democratic Progres-
sive Party - gained strength. The constitutional court began to assert itself
and to promote democratisation. In 1990, the court ruled that the parliamen-
tary institutions, elections to which had been largely frozen for four decades,
were to be elected afresh.9
In 1990, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the PRC was enacted by the PRC parliament. In 1991, Hong Kong
enacted its Bill of Rights, inaugurating the era of constitutional judicial re-
view of legislation in Hong Kong. In the 19 90s, the Hong Kong courts built
up a body of jurisprudence on human rights. Also in 1991, a proportion of
legislators in Hong Kong were elected directly by universal suffrage for the
first time in the colony's history. After the handover in 1997, Hong Kong
courts, now under the leadership of the new Court of Final Appeal, have
continued to play an important role in constitutional developments. The pro-
portion of legislators elected by universal suffrage has continued to increase.
Since 1991, the ROC Constitution in force in Taiwan has undergone seven
rounds of amendment. At the same time, the constitutional court in Taiwan
has established itself as a major force in constitutional review, legal reform,
human rights protection and in arbitrating jurisdictional conflicts between
different branches of government. Also in the 1990s, Taiwan achieved full
democratisation, with the first-ever direct election of the President in 1996,
and the first-ever change of ruling party in 2000.
Constitutionalism is characterised by the rule of law and of the constitu-
tion, separation of powers and judicial independence, and the constitutional
protection of human rights. It subjects political power to legal control, and
enables peaceful transfer of political power in accordance with electoral rules
of the game. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have made significant progress in
developing constitutionalism since the 1980s. This article will compare the
records of these two "islands" (territories) in this regard, and explore the
future of a constitutionalism rooted in Chinese culture and society.
8 For an overview of Hong Kong's democratisation process, see Kathleen Cheek-Milby, A Legislature
Comes of Age: Hong Kong's Search for Influence and Identity (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1995); Lo Shiu-hing, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan
Press, 1997); Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1999).
9 For an overview of Taiwan's democratisation process, see Roy (n 6 above); Linda Chao and Ramon
H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social
Change in the Republic of China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989); Steve Tsang and Hung-
mao Tien (eds), Democratization in Taiwan (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999).
Vol 37 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 649 2007
650 Albert H.Y. Chen
The article, apart from this introduction, will consist of the following
sections. Section 2 defines constitutionalism and examines from a historical
perspective the origins of constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan. It
also provides the historical background that paved the way for constitutional
developments in the two territories in the last two decades, and outlines the
general pattern of the evolution of constitutional thinking and practice in
the two territories before the 1980s. Section 3 considers constitution-making
activities with regard to or in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the last two decades.
These include the enactment of the Hong Kong Basic Law by the PRC,
constitutional reform in Hong Kong undertaken by the British colonial govern-
ment, and the seven constitutional amendments enacted in Taiwan since 1991.
Section 4 deals with constitutional interpretation. In the case of Taiwan, the
discussion focuses on the work of the Council of Grand Justices (CGJ) of the
Judicial Yuan, whereas in Hong Kong's case, which does not have a centralised
system of constitutional review, the constitutional record of the Hong Kong
courts will be considered. A comparison is offered of constitutional law issues
in Hong Kong and Taiwan by identifying selected cases decided by the Hong
Kong courts and selected interpretations of the CGJ. Finally, Section 5 reflects
on the current state of constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and
explores the comparative significance of their constitutional developments
and their implications for constitutionalism in China itself.
2. The Origins and Evolution of Constitutionalism in
Hong Kong and Taiwan
Constitutionalism as a theory and practice of government and law is a
product of modem Western civilisation. Like science, it has proved to have
universal appeal to humanity and has in the last two centuries been trans-
planted to all comers of the earth. The possession of a constitution has come
to be a hallmark of the modem sovereign state. Countries of different polit-
ical persuasions, whether capitalist or communist, have unanimously
pronounced that their constitution is the authoritative and supreme law of
their land. Like science, democracy and human rights, constitutionalism has
come to be regarded as a sign of modernity and modernisation.
Yet the history of the modern world has taught us that all too often rulers
and governments pay no more than lip service to their constitutions and con-
stitutionalism. Authentic constitutionalism is hard to come by. Attempts at
transplanting constitutionalism from the West to developing countries have
frequently ended in failures. Karl Loewenstein"o drew a conceptual distinc-
10 Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Government Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
195 7), pp 147-153.
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tion between "nominal", "semantic" and "normative" constitutions. Nom-
inal constitutions do not correspond to the reality of the political system at
all and are no more than words. Semantic constitutions do tell us something
about what the political system is and how it operates, but play no role
in controlling the behaviour of political actors. Normative constitutions
determine who become power holders, and really regulate the exercise of power
and the relationship between power holders; their normative force is
internalised by political actors who really take the rules stipulated in the con-
stitution seriously, respect them and abide by them. A normative constitution
is thus an essential ingredient of the practice of authentic constitutionalism.
As pointed out by Nino, the word "constitutionalism" "has a range of
meanings that vary in their conceptual thickness"." These meanings include
(1) the rule of law (government being conducted according to legal rules),
(2) the constitution being a higher law, (3) the law having certain character-
istics such as being general, precise, public, non-retroactive and impartially
applied, (4) separation of powers and judicial independence, (5) the protec-
tion of individual rights, (6) judicial review, and (7) democracy. However,
this analysis has not clarified the relationship between these ingredients of
constitutionalism. For the purpose of this article, constitutionalism will be
understood as the combination of a legal system that practices the rule of law
(including elements (1), (3) and (6) above) and a political system that prac-
tices separation of powers and internal checks and balances, where this
combined system ensures that human rights are respected and protected. The
protection of human rights is a matter of degree, and a democracy is where
political rights as ingredients of human rights are fully practiced. 12
The historical origins or roots of constitutionalism in Hong Kong and
Taiwan are quite different. Constitutionalism in Taiwan can be traced back
to the enactment of the ROC Constitution in Nanking, capital of the ROC,
in December 1946 by a National Assembly dominated by the Kuomintang
but in which other political forces in China (other than the Communists)
also participated.13 That constitution was the culmination of several decades
of constitution-making in China beginning with the promulgation of the first
" Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996), p 3.
12 Constitutional democracy is thus the highest level of achievement of constitutionalism. Taking Brit-
ain as an example, constitutionalism was in place when a constitutional monarchy was established
towards the end of the 17th century after the Glorious Revolution. However, full democratisation
was only completed in the 20th century. See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Demo-
cracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America (Boston: Ginn & Co., revised edn, 1950), pp 2, 31,
45, 50, 128; John Canning (ed), The Illustrated Macaulay's History of England (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1988); W.A. Speck, A Concise History of Britain 1707-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
13 See Jing Jiren (#*Wl), History of Chinese Constitutionalism ('rPEM *P) (Taipei: Lianjing, 1984),
Ch 16.
Vol 37 Part 2
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 651 2007
652 Albert H.Y. Chen
provisional constitution of the ROC in 1912; its immediate predecessors
include the Provisional Constitution of 1931 and the Draft Constitution of
1936." On the other hand, constitutionalism (particularly the rule of law,
judicial independence and respect for civil liberties as ingredients of consti-
tutionalism discussed above) in Hong Kong was originally a product of British
colonial rule." Constitutional government in Hong Kong was ensured by a
colonial constitution and colonial practice of government until 1 July 1997,
when Hong Kong was re-unified with China and became a Special Adminis-
trative Region (SAR) governed by the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR
enacted by the Chinese parliament - the National People's Congress.16 It is
therefore ironic that while Hong Kong today is part of the PRC" and the
debate about reunification or independence still tears the people of Taiwan
apart, constitutionalism in Taiwan has in fact been a continuous outgrowth
from a constitution made in China and for the whole of China, whereas Hong
Kong's pre-1997 experience of constitutionalism was derived from British
colonial rule.
The 1946 ROC Constitution was, unlike the subsequent constitutions of
the PRC, based on the Western model of the liberal democratic state. It pro-
vides for popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the supremacy of the
constitution, the separation of powers (both horizontal and vertical), checks
and balances, and the protection of human rights and people's welfare. It
envisages multi-party politics and the democratic election of parliamentary
bodies. It even establishes the CGJ of the Judicial Yuan, a constitutional court
that can interpret the Constitution and review whether laws and orders are
consistent with the Constitution - a very progressive arrangement in 1946
when the German Constitutional Court - the principal model of constitu-
tional courts in the second half of the twentieth century in legal systems
belonging to the continental European Civil Law family - had not yet been
established."1
14 See Jing (n 13 above).
15 For an overview of the constitutional, political and legal systems of colonial Hong Kong (especially
in the 1980s), see Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 4th edn, 1986); Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law in Hong
Kong (Hong Kong: China and Hong Kong Law Studies, Vol 1, 1987, Vol II, 1988); Peter Harris, Hong
Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1988); Peter Wesley-Smith, An
Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987).
16 See Wang Shuweng (ed), Introduction to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(Beijing: Law Press, 2000); Xiao Weiyun, One Country, Two Systems: An Account of the Drafting of the
Hong Kong Basic Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001); Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Con-
stitutional Order (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2nd edn, 1999).
17 Article 1 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR (hereinafter the "Basic Law") provides that the
Hong Kong SAR is an inalienable part of the PRC.
1 The Basic Law of West Germany was enacted in 1949. Articles 92-94 provide for the establishment
of the Federal Constitutional Court.
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Yet the ROC Constitution never had the chance of being put into prac-
tice in mainland China. Enacted to bolster the legitimacy of the Kuomintang
regime at a time when China was on the brink of civil war, the fate of the
1946 Constitution was to be a sorry one. Full-scale civil war did erupt in
1947; the Kuomintang forces were defeated, and in 1949 the Kuomintang
government fled from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, which had come
under the rule of the ROC regime when the Japanese surrendered in 1945. In
April 1948 - only a few months after the ROC Constitution came into force
in December 1947, the National Assembly (the organ which had the author-
ity to amend the Constitution) enacted, in the form of additional provisions
to the Constitution, the Temporary Provisions for the Period of National
Mobilization to Suppress the Communist Rebellion ("the Temporary Provi-
sions"), which had the effect of superseding some of the provisions of the
Constitution which limited presidential power. In December 1948, a state of
martial law (similar to the "state of siege" in continental European legal sys-
tems) was declared in mainland China by the Kuomintang government. " In
May 1949, a martial law decree was also promulgated with regard to Taiwan.20
Under the rule of martial law, civilians accused of certain crimes were to be
tried by military courts.21 Civil liberties were curtailed by martial law decrees
and other laws and regulations. Dissidents were persecuted and prosecuted
for political crimes; many were imprisoned and some put to death. Martial
law was only lifted in July 1987, thus ending probably the longest martial law
rule within a state in modem history.
Although the text of the Constitution has remained intact, the Tempor-
ary Provisions were amended four times in 1960, 1966 (in which year the
Temporary Provisions were twice amended) and 1972.22 The 1960 amend-
ment removed the constitutional limit of one person's presidency to two terms,
so that Chiang Kai-shek could serve a third term. In fact he also served a
fourth (1966 to 1972) and fifth term until his death in 1974. Other amend-
ments served to enhance presidential power. The CGJ was called upon in
1954 to resolve the question of whether members of the Legislative Yuan and
the Control Yuan (and by implication also the National Assembly) elected
all over China in 1947 to 1948 could stay in office despite their constitu-
tional term of office having expired (since it was impossible to hold fresh
19 Martial law was lifted in January 1949, but was re-imposed in July 1949; see Chen Xinmin (I*Wit),
Constitutional Law (**S a) (Taipei: Sanmin, 5th edn, 2005), p 464.
20 For an overview of Taiwan's legal history during, before and after the state of martial law, see Lin
Shantian (#ill III), Fifty Years of Taiwan Legal History 1945 -1995 (K+** nA#j*$J 1945-
1995) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Department of Law, 1995); Wang Taisheng (TER),
Taiwan Legal History (A#W 41%X) (Taipei: Yuanzhao, 2001).
21 See Chen (n 19 above), pp 468-469, 472-473; Hungdah Chiu, "Constitutional Development in the
Republic of China in Taiwan", in Steve Tsang (ed) (n 3 above), p 17, at pp 25-28.
22 See Chen (n 19 above), pp 926-934.
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elections in mainland China because of the "Communist Rebellion"). The
CGJ in Interpretation No 31 said yes. In 1960, when Chiang sought an amend-
ment by the National Assembly of the Temporary Provisions regarding the
two-term limit to the office of the presidency (which required a quorum of
two-thirds of all members of the Assembly), the CGJ was called upon again
to answer the question of what constituted a quorum of the Assembly given
that many members originally elected were not in Taiwan. Again the CGJ
(in Interpretation No 85) gave the answer expected by the government and
defined the quorum with reference to members available to attend meetings
in Taiwan. In the first three decades of its existence, the CGJ (with one pos-
sible exception 23 ) never exercised its power to declare any law or regulation
unconstitutional. 24 The CGJ was generally perceived as a tool or accomplice
of the regime to add constitutional legitimacy to its rule rather than a true
guardian of constitutional norms and rights."5
The Chiang regime tried to promote the image of Taiwan under its rule as
that part of China that was still free and not subject to the tyranny of com-
munism. It was claimed that constitutional government was practiced in
Taiwan.26 Compared to mainland China at the time (from the 1950s to the
1970s), the government in Taiwan can probably be regarded as having prac-
ticed more constitutionalism than the communist government in mainland,
if constitutionalism is a matter of degree, and a low degree of constitutional-
ism is still better than none at all. In Taiwan at the time, the rule of law
existed to some extent, though the law was draconian and largely an instru-
ment of rule. Property rights were protected, and there was freedom in the
economic domain. Some degree of social and political pluralism was also tol-
erated. For example, elections were held at the level of local government (of
counties and cities other than Taipei and Kaohsiung). Pursuant to the 1966
and 1972 amendments to the Temporary Provisions, elections to a limited
proportion of seats in the central parliamentary institutions (ie the National
23 The possible exception is Interpretation No 86 (in 1960) in which the CGJ hinted, but did not
expressly declare, that a particular arrangement whereby the lower courts were administratively
under the Ministry of Justice of the Executive Yuan rather than the Judicial Yuan was unconstitu-
tional. No action however was taken by the Government to rectify the matter until 1980. See text
accompanying n 140 below.
24 See Su Yongqin (47Y '), "Interpretations by the Council of Grand Justices and Social Change in
Taiwan" in Su Yongqin, The Theory and Practice of the Control of Constitutionality ( '#J$14 ilXi
1l fM (Taipei: Yuedan, 1994), p 271; Ye Junrong ( Democratic Transition and Constitu-
tional Change ( (Taipei: Yuanzhao, 2003), Ch 7.
25 See Ye (n 24 above), pp 267-268; Jau-yuan Hwang and Jiunn-rong Yeh, "Taiwan", in Cheryl Saunders
and Graham Hassall (eds), Asia-Pacific Constitutional Yearbook 1995 (Melbourne: Centre for
Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne, 1997), p 279, at pp 282-286; Tsung-
fu Chen, "The Role of Law in Taiwan: Culture, Ideology, and Social Change", in C. Stephen
Hsu (ed), Understanding China's Legal System (New York: New York University Press, 2003), p 374, at
pp 3 8 3 -384.
26 See Tsung-fu Chen, ibid., pp 381-382.
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Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan) were also instituted.
Some non-KMT or "opposition" (or "Tang-wai") politicians were success-
fully elected in these elections, despite severe restrictions on freedoms of
speech, press, publication, assembly and association, and the fact that they
were not allowed to form any political party.17
Whereas Taiwan had been under Japanese colonial rule for half a century
before it was incorporated into the Republic of China in 1945, Hong Kong
experienced colonial rule for one and a half century since the island of Hong
Kong was ceded to Britain in 1842 after China's defeat in the Opium War.
Both Japanese and British colonial rule had contributed to introduce West-
ern ideas of constitutionalism or at least the rule of law to Taiwan and Hong
Kong respectively. Although Japan did not establish any parliament or legis-
lative assembly for Taiwan and the Governor of Taiwan under Japanese rule
exercised both executive and legislative power, and although the police exer-
cised enormous powers, a modem court system was established in Taiwan and
a legal profession also developed.21 Unlike Hong Kong, where a two-way free
movement of population existed across the Hong Kong-mainland border un-
til the communist takeover of the mainland,2 ' Taiwan was largely separated
from the Chinese mainland while it was a Japanese colony. Being insulated
from political and social developments in China, Taiwanese people began to
develop their own sense of identity under Japanese rule.30 Since the 1920s,
Japan actually pursued the policy of assimilation (into Japanese language and
culture) in Taiwan.31 Some enlightened Taiwanese desired self-government
under Japanese rule and campaigned for it. The rise of political consciousness
among the Taiwanese elite in the 1920s and 1930s was a significant phenom-
enon. 32 After Japan's defeat in the Second World War, many Taiwanese at
first welcomed Taiwan's re-incorporation into China.3 3 It was only after the
massacre and repression of the "28 February incident" (of 1947)34 and with
the subsequent authoritarian rule or "White Terror" of the Chiang Kai-shek
27 See Chao and Myers (n 9 above), Chs 3, 4; Roy (n 6 above), Ch 6.
28 For an overview of Taiwan's legal system under Japanese rule, see Wang (n 20 above); Wang Tay-
sheng, Legal Reform in Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule 1895-1945: The Reception of Western Law
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
29 See Albert H.Y. Chen, "The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experi-
ence" (1988) 33 McGill Law Journal 631; Johannes Chan and Bart Rwezaura (eds), Immigration Law
in Hong Kong: An Interdisciplinary Study (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2004).
30 This contrasts with the case of Hong Kong under British rule, where the people identified themselves
as Chinese at that time and were concerned about China's destiny. See Fok Kai-cheong, Lectures on
Hong Kong History: Hong Kong's Role in Modern Chinese History (Hong Kong: Commercial Press,
1990).
31 Ito (n 6 above), Ch 7.
32 Ibid.
33 Roy (n 6 above), p 79.
3 See Li Xiaofeng ($Ri ), Understanding February 28 (M81 =A) (Taipei: Yushanshe, 1998).
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regime that some Taiwanese came to resent rule by the exiled regime from
the mainland and sought to establish Taiwan eventually as an independent
nation state consisting only of the people of Taiwan."
Unlike Taiwan, which has been governed since 1947 on the basis of a
constitution that is liberal and democratic on the face of it though in practice
subject to the Temporary Provisions and martial law decrees, Hong Kong
before the 1980s was ruled by the British36 on the basis of a very rudimentary
constitution contained in the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions issued by
the British monarch." Whereas the ROC Constitution was designed for the
most populous nation in the world, the Hong Kong Letters Patent and Royal
Instructions were similar to other constitutional instruments for the conquered
colonies of the British Empire.38 They were nineteenth century-style consti-
tutional documents with few principles of constitutionalism enshrined in them.
Power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor, who ruled with the
assistance of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council appointed by
him. By co-opting leading members of the local business and professional
elite into these Councils,3 9 the colonial government was able to practice a
kind of government by consultation and consensus even though there was
no democratic election" except to a municipal council (called the Urban
Council, with responsibilities in the domains of public health, environmenta
hygiene and recreational facilities) on the basis of a very limited franchise.41
The English legal system based on the common law, the rule of law and
judicial independence was transplanted to Hong Kong. So was the English
model of a legal profession divided into solicitors and barristers.42 There was
no bill of rights in the colonial constitution, and laws enacted by the colonial
regime placed considerable restrictions on freedoms of speech, publication,
3 See C.L. Chiou, Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan
from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995).
36 The legal basis was three treaties (regarded by the PRC as "unequal treaties") which the government
of the Qing Dynasty signed with Britain regarding the cession of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon
Peninsula, and the 99-year lease of the New Territories. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty
1898-1997 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, revised edn, 1998).
37 See Miners (n 15 above), Ch 5 and appendix; Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative
Law in Hong Kong (n 15 above), Vol I, Ch 4.
38 See Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966); Albert
H.Y. Chen, "From Colony to Special Administrative Region: Hong Kong's Constitutional Journey",
in Raymond Wacks (ed), The Future of the Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1989), p 76, at 76-79.
3 Ambrose King, "Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong", in Sing Ming (ed), Hong
Kong Government & Politics (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2003), p 69.
40 For an overview of the original political system in Hong Kong, see references cited in n 15 above, and
Steve Tsang (ed), Government and Politics: A Documentary History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 1995).
41 See Fan Zhenru (9*tk), The Electoral System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (ffg*
JOMA lW*i)) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2006), pp 39-43.
42 See Wesley-Smith, An Introduction to the Hong Kong Legal System (n 15 above), Ch 11.
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assembly and association, although in practice some of these laws were not
rigorously enforced.13
However, the paradox - or some would say the miracle - of Hong Kong
under British colonial rule was that by the 1970s, the people of Hong Kong
enjoyed more civil liberties (particularly freedom of the person, freedom of
speech, press and publication and freedom of association and assembly) than
the people of mainland China and even the people of Taiwan.44 Hong Kong's
reputation in terms of the rule of law and efficiency of government was one of
the best in Asia."5 In terms of civil liberties - key ingredients of constitution-
alism, Hong Kong's performance as of the 1970s surpassed those of the other
three of the "Four Little Dragons" of East Asia - Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea. In his book on A Modern History of Hong Kong, the historian Steve
Tsang described the Hong Kong Government by the time of the Sino-British
negotiation on Hong Kong's future in the early 1980s as "the best possible
government in the Chinese political tradition": "building on the basis of its
own record and responding steadily to changes after 1945, the government
produced a paradox. While it remained an essentially British colonial admin-
istration, it also fulfilled the basic conditions for [an ideal Confucian]
government, namely, efficiency, fairness, honesty, benevolent paternalism,
and non-intrusion into the lives of ordinary people. This was an achievement
that had no match in over two thousand years of China's history as a unified
country, and could be rivalled only after Taiwan successfully transformed
itself into a democracy in 1996."146
This may to some extent be an over-statement, but it is probably true that
by the early 1980s, most Hong Kong people preferred the continuation of
Hong Kong's political status quo to the risks and uncertainty of its reunification
with the PRC. Indeed, the very reason why by the 1970s the British Hong
Kong government could afford to allow Hong Kong people to enjoy more
civil liberties than, say, the people of Taiwan was to do with the existence
of this "Other" - mainland China under Communist rule. Although the
Cultural Revolution in China had a spillover effect in Hong Kong in the
43 See Raymond Wacks (ed), Civil Liberties in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988);
Nihal Jayawickrama, "Public Law", in Raymond Wacks (ed), The Law in Hong Kong 1969-1989
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), Ch 2.
44 For an overview of the history and the present status of human rights in East and South-East Asian
countries, see Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy, The Politics of Human Rights in East Asia (London:
Pluto Press, 2001); Randall Peerenboom, Carole J. Petersen and Albert H.Y. Chen (eds), Human
Rights in Asia (London: Routledge, 2006).
45 For an overview of the history and the present status of rule of law in East and South-East Asian
countries, see The Rule of Law: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim (Washington, DC: Mansfield Center
for Pacific Affairs, 2000); Randall Peerenboom (ed), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law (London: Routledge
Curzon, 2004).
46 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004),
p 197.
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form of the riots against colonial rule in 1967, the overwhelming majority of
the population of Hong Kong stood on the side of the colonial government at
the time." Since then, and particularly since the introduction of new social
(and social welfare) policies" of the 1970s by Governor MacLehose,4 1 it was
obvious to all that the people of Hong Kong supported the continuation of
colonial rule, for they realised that the only alternative to colonial rule was
integration into Communist China. Thus, despite the growth of a local iden-
tity (as "Hongkongers") among members of the new generation born in Hong
Kong after the War," who, unlike their parents who were refugees from main-
land China fleeing to Hong Kong, considered Hong Kong their home and
never experienced living elsewhere in China, there was never an indepen-
dence movement in Hong Kong, unlike the case of Taiwan. And since the
population accepted the legitimacy of British rule, there were few dissidents5 1
or political prisoners in Hong Kong (though the Communists or pro-Com-
munist elements in Hong Kong had been under surveillance and discriminated
against by the colonial government). The security of colonial rule in Hong
Kong,53 as contrasted with the sense of insecurity of the Kuomintang regime
in Taiwan when faced with demands for Taiwanese independence and the
end of one-party rule by the Kuomintang (as well as problems of interna-
tional non-recognition and isolation after being expelled from the United
Nations in 1971), can thus explain the greater degree of civil liberties in
Hong Kong.
Thus as of the early 1980s, Hong Kong enjoyed the rule of law, an open
society, a fair degree of civil liberties as well as a prosperous economy, but
under the colonial rule of the British and a rudimentary constitution that did
4 Tsang, ibid., pp 183-190; David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post,
1983), Ch 3; Richard Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place - Borrowed Time (London: Andre Deutsch,
1968).
48 Tsang (n 46 above), p 192; Joe England and John Rear, Industrial Relations and Law in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp 21-23, 203-205; Nelson W.S. Chow, "A Review of
Social Policies in Hong Kong", in Alex Y.H. Kwan and David K.K. Chan (eds), Hong Kong Society: A
Reader (Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1986), Ch 6.
4 Governor MacLehose also established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) to
combat the then prevalent corruption: see H.J. Lethbridge, Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, Cor-
ruption and the ICAC (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985).
50 See Tsang (n 46 above), pp 190-196; David Faure, "Reflections on Being Chinese in Hong Kong", in
Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (eds), Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842-1997 (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press, 1997), Ch 5.
51 Although there were pressure groups opposing particular government policies, there was no
organisation seeking to overthrow the colonial Hong Kong Government or holding political ideol-
ogy of such aim. See Miners (n 15 above), Ch 13.
52 For discussion of the rightist (pro-Kuomintang) and the leftist (pro-Communist) elements in the
Hong Kong political arena and their respective relationship with the colonial Hong Kong Govern-
ment, see Yu Shengwu (ARR) and Liu Shuyong (V14il) (eds), Hong Kong in the Twentieth Century
(20 WE ffg) (Hong Kong: QilinBooks, 1995), Chs 8, 9.
5 See Miners (n 15 above), Ch 3; Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press, 1982); Ambrose Y.C. King and Rance P.L. Lee (eds), Social Life and Development in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981).
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not expressly guarantee human rights and did not provide any democracy. At
the same time, Taiwan, while economically successful in market capitalism
and possessing the semblance of a modern constitution that is liberal and
democratic on the face of it, practiced severe restrictions on civil liberties
and repression of political dissidents, though ordinary people could vote in
local elections as well as (since 1969) elections for limited numbers of seats
in the national parliamentary bodies, and some opposition politicians
were elected into office. These, then, are the points of departure for the
liberalisation, democratisation and constitution-making in Hong Kong and
Taiwan in and after the 1980s.
3. Constitution-Making for and in Hong Kong and Taiwan Since
the 1980s
With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the rise of Deng Xiaoping as
supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s, the leftist
excesses of the Maoist era came to an end and a new era of "reforming and
opening" began in China. A new policy towards Taiwan was also adopted."
Instead of calling for the "liberation" of Taiwan from Kuomintang rule and
from capitalism and thus extending communism to Taiwan, a new concept
was developed for the purpose of reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland.
This was "one country, two systems", which would allow the peaceful co-
existence of capitalism (in Taiwan) with socialism (in the Mainland), a high
degree of autonomy for Taiwan under PRC sovereignty and the preservation
of the existing social and economic systems in Taiwan after reunification. In
the new (and fourth) Constitution of the PRC enacted in late 1982, Article
31 provides for the possibility of the establishment of Special Administrative
Regions in the PRC which practice social and economic systems different
from those in the Mainland.
In September 1982, Britain and China began negotiations over the con-
stitutional future of Hong Kong."5 It is believed that the negotiations were
initiated not because China took the initiative to demand from the British
the return of Hong Kong, but because by the early 1980s the British Govern-
ment was concerned that there was no legal basis for its continued governance
of the New Territories after 1997 (the New Territories being that part of the
Hong Kong colony which was leased by the Qing Dynasty Government in
54 See references cited in n 2 above.
55 For an overview of the Sino-British negotiation and Hong Kong's return to China, see Chung Sze-
yue, Hong Kong's Journey to Reunification (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001); Steve Tsang,
Hong Kong: An Appointment with China (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997); Mark Roberti, The Fall of Hong
Kong: China's Triumph and Britain's Betrayal (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).
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China to Britain for 99 years in 1898, unlike Hong Kong Island and the
Kowloon Peninsula which were permanently ceded to Britain in 1842 and
1860 respectively) and wanted to seek from the Chinese Government its
agreement to continued British administration of the whole of Hong Kong
after 1997.
The PRC considered all the three treaties constituting the legal basis
for British rule in Hong Kong to be "unequal treaties" and not binding on
the PRC. The creation of the British colony of Hong Kong as a result of the
Opium War and its subsequent expansion in size was part and parcel of the
story of humiliation and shame for the Chinese people in the face of Western
imperialism in modem history, and being fervent nationalists, the Chinese
Communists ruled out completely the option of legally consenting to contin-
ued British rule in Hong Kong. The concept of "one country, two systems",
though originally conceived for Taiwan, was at hand and thus offered to Bri-
tain as the solution for Hong Kong's constitutional future. It was proposed
that the whole of the Hong Kong colony would be returned to the PRC in
July 1997, and it would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of
the PRC enjoying a high degree of autonomy. Its existing social and eco-
nomic systems and laws, and the lifestyle and liberties of its people would all
be preserved. Communism would not be imposed on Hong Kong, nor would
Communist Party cadres take over the Hong Kong Government. The prin-
ciple of rule was "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong", in accordance with
a Basic Law in which China's promises for post-1997 Hong Kong would be
translated into the text of a constitutional instrument. After nearly two years
of strenuous negotiations, the British found that they had no choice but to
accept the Chinese proposal. The result was the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion on the Question of Hong Kong signed in 1984.
The drafting of the Basic Law which began in 1985 and concluded in
1990 was one of the most significant exercises in constitution-making in the
history of the PRC.56 The Basic Law would serve as a "mini-constitution" for
the Hong Kong SAR. It would define and regulate the domestic political
system of Hong Kong as well as its constitutional relationship with the cen-
tral government in Beijing. It also had to guarantee the continuation of Hong
Kong's existing laws, civil liberties and human rights, and social and eco-
nomic systems. If the Basic Law were to achieve its objectives, it had to do
even better than some of the previous constitutions of the PRC itself, which,
in Loewenstein's terminology (as discussed in section 2 of this article) were
no more than "nominal" or "semantic" constitutions. If the constitutional
56 See references cited in n 16 above, and Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert H.Y. Chen (eds), The Basic
Law and Hong Kong's Future (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988); Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark
(eds), The Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1991).
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experiment of "one country, two systems" was to work, the Basic Law had to
become a "normative" constitution.
The drafting of the Basic Law was entrusted to a Drafting Committee
appointed by Beijing consisting of both Mainland and Hong Kong members.
At the same time, a Consultative Committee was set up in Hong Kong con-
sisting of Hong Kong people elected from different sectors and walks of life."
The first draft of the Basic Law was published for public consultation in April
1988. After extensive discussion and debates, amendments were made and
the second draft was published in February 1989. The final version was
enacted by the National People's Congress in April 1990.
The most controversial issues arising from the drafting of the Basic Law
concerned how democratic the political system of the Hong Kong SAR was
to be and how much power the central government in Beijing could exercise
over Hong Kong." As mentioned above, despite the growth of self-
identification as "Hongkongers" among the post-War generations of Hong
Kong people, there was by the early 1980s no political movement for either
Hong Kong's independence or reunification with China. When the Sino-
British negotiations on Hong Kong's future began in 1982, there was also no
movement for Hong Kong's self-determination or independence. There were
two major schools of thought among the political and intellectual elite and
leaders of public opinion at the time. One school supported and lobbied for
the continuation of the status quo (ie British rule in Hong Kong). The other
school supported the PRC's proposal for Hong Kong's reunification with China
under the umbrella of "one country, two systems", but insisted that autonomy
for the Hong Kong SAR must be accompanied by democracy. In other words,
while this school supported the principle of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong", it considered essential that those Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong
be elected freely and democratically by the people of Hong Kong.
The history of the drafting of the Basic Law was intertwined with that of
political and constitutional reforms launched by the British Hong Kong
Government. These proceeded in several stages." In 1982, the District Boards
- advisory bodies at local levels - were established consisting of members
appointed by the Government as well members elected by universal suffrage.
At the same time, the franchise for the existing Urban Council was broad-
ened to become universal suffrage. Secondly, some of the seats in the Legislative
Council - hitherto an entirely appointed body - were opened up for election
for the first time in the colony's history in 1985. The election was not however
5 See references cited in n 16 above; and Emily Lau, "The Early History of the Drafting Process", in
Wesley-Smith and Chen (eds) (n 56 above), Ch 6.
5 See references cited in n 56 above; and William McGurn (ed), Basic Law, Basic Questions (Hong
Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1988).
5 See references cited in n 8 above.
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by universal suffrage. Instead, "functional constituencies" were created, such
as the constituency of members of a chamber of commerce, the constituency
of members of an industrialists' federation, the constituency of banks, the
constituency of trade unions, the constituency of lawyers, the constituency of
doctors, the constituency of engineers, the constituency of teachers, etc. Dis-
trict Boards, the Urban Council and the newly created Regional Council
could also elect members to the Legislative Council (LegCo). 60 In 1987, there
was a great debate over whether in the 1988 election to LegCo, some seats
should be opened up for direct election (ie by universal suffrage) on a district
basis.61 Pro-democracy politicians, intellectuals and civil society groups pushed
hard for direct election in 1988. However, the Chinese Government, pro-
China political forces in Hong Kong and many in the business community in
Hong Kong harboured reservations about rapid democratisation in Hong Kong.
It was argued that before the blueprint for Hong Kong's post-1997 political
system was unveiled by the Basic Law, the British Hong Kong Government
should not unilaterally introduce a political system of its own design in Hong
Kong and impose a fait accompli before the Basic Law was enacted. Ultimately,
the Hong Kong Government adopted a compromised solution of not intro-
ducing direct election in 1988 but promising it for 1991.62
After the Tiananmen Incident of 4 June 1989, there was an upsurge in
demands for democratisation in Hong Kong. The Basic Law, which was en-
acted in 1990, did not rule out direct election (by universal suffrage). Instead,
it provides for the "gradual and orderly" democratisation of Hong Kong, and
stipulates that the ultimate goal for the development of the political system
of the Hong Kong SAR is the election of the Chief Executive and of all
members of LegCo by universal suffrage.63 However, this would not be pos-
sible immediately upon the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR in 1997.
The first two Chief Executives of the SAR were to be elected by electoral
colleges. The number of LegCo members elected by universal suffrage would
increase from 20 (out of 60) in the first LegCo of the SAR to 24 in the second
and to 30 in the third. The remaining seats would be elected mainly (and
60 See White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, Nov 1984).
61 See Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, May 1987).
62 See White Paper: The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, Feb 1988).
63 See Basic Law, Arts 45 and 68. Article 45 provides that candidates in the election of Chief Executive
by universal suffrage must be "nominate[d] by a broadly representative nominating committee in
accordance with democratic procedures".
64 For the method of establishing the first HKSAR Government, see The Decision of the National
People's Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the 1st Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted by the 3rd Session of the 7th
National People's Congress on 4 Apr 1990.
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completely in the third LegCo) by functional constituencies (and partly by
an electoral college in the case of the first and second LegCos).6
The Basic Law (particularly as contrasted with the PRC Constitution it-
self) can be said to be liberal democratic in orientation. Ironically, there are
interesting parallels between the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR and the
ROC Constitution of 1946 (rather than the PRC Constitution itself), which
as mentioned above is also a liberal democratic one. Both constitutional docu-
ments contain a bill of rights. Both allow for free and open competition for
parliamentary seats in accordance with electoral rules of the game rather than
one-party rule. Interestingly, the functional constituencies prescribed by the
Basic Law find a parallel in the occupational constituencies provided for in
the ROC Constitution which (together with geographical district constitu-
encies) can elect some of the members of the National Assembly and the
Legislative Yuan.66 Also, as in the case of the ROC Constitution which pro-
vides for checks-and-balances between, for example, the President, the Premier
of the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan, 67 the Basic Law provides for
checks-and-balances between the Chief Executive and the Legislative Coun-
cil.68 Ji Pengfei, Chairman of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, explained
to the National People's Congress in 1990 that the executive and legislature
of the Hong Kong SAR should both mutually cooperate with and mutually
provide a check against one another.69 This is reminiscent of what Sun Yat-
sen said about the relationship between government organs in the five-Yuan
constitutional system.70 Thus the Basic Law provides that if the Chief Execu-
tive refuses to assent to a bill passed by the Legislative Council, he may return
it to LegCo for reconsideration." If LegCo then passes the original bill again
by a two-thirds majority, the Chief Executive must either sign the bill into
law or dissolve LegCo (Articles 49, 50).72 If LegCo is dissolved and the re-
elected LegCo against passes the bill by a two-thirds majority, the Chief
Executive must either sign it or resign (Article 52)." These arrangements
are comparable to those stipulated in Article 57(3) of the ROC Constitu-
tion. The Basic Law (Article 64) also provides that the executive is account-
able to the legislature. This again is reminiscent of Article 57 of the ROC
Constitution.
65 See Basic Law, Annexes I and II.
66 See ROC Constitution, Arts 26 and 64.
67 ROC Constitution, Arts 39, 43, 55 and 57.
68 Basic Law, Arts 49-52.
69 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
and Related Documents (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2007), pp 58 (Chinese version), 202 (English
version).
70 See Hu Fo (fl) et al, The Constitution of the Republic of China and the Spirit Behind the Founding of the
Nation (+ OK W it T#) (Taipei: Sanrin, 1993), Ch 14.
71 Basic Law, Art 49.
72 Basic Law, Arts 49 and 50.
7 Basic Law, Art 52.
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The Basic Law was enacted in 1990, but it was only going to come into
effect in 1997. The enactment of the Basic Law in 1990 did not however put
an end to constitutional controversies in Hong Kong. In 1991, some of the
seats in LegCo were opened to direct election by universal suffrage for the
first time. The pro-democracy politicians, who had led the massive demon-
strations in Hong Kong in support of the student movement in Beijing in
1989, won a landslide victory. 4 In 1992, the newly arrived Governor of Hong
Kong, Christopher Patten, announced an ambitious plan for political reform
in Hong Kong which involved a radical broadening of the franchise for the
seats elected by functional constituencies (increasing the number of eligible
voters in these constituencies from less than 100,000 to over two million).75
The Chinese Government condemned the plan as being inconsistent with
the Basic Law and the agreement reached in 1990 between the Chinese and
British Governments over the political development in Hong Kong. 76 After
17 rounds of negotiation between the two governments from April to
November 1993, the negotiations broke down. 7 Governor Patten then uni-
laterally put the bill for the reform to LegCo7 which passed it by a narrow
majority. The 1995 LegCo election was thus conducted in accordance with
the new electoral scheme." The Chinese Government responded by "estab-
lishing another stove",so rescinding its previous consent (given tacitly in 1990)
to LegCo elected in 1995 continuing as the first LegCo of the Hong Kong
SAR in 1997, and arranging for the establishment of a Provisional Legisla-
tive Council in 1997 to take charge of Hong Kong legislative matters before
the first LegCo could be elected in accordance with the Basic Law."1
Apart from the enactment of the Basic Law and the Patten political re-
form, the other major effort in constitution-making in Hong Kong was the
enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991.2 This legisla-
7 See Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun (eds), Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
1993).
7 See Alvin So (n 8 above), Ch 7.
76 See Kaifang Zazhi She (Open Magazine Press) (ed), The Struggle of the Century Between China and
Britain: Collection of Articles on the Debate Regarding Patten's Political Reform Proposal (4 I11At1C
: 1Aikf $) (Hong Kong: Kaifang Magazine Press, 1994).
7 See Lai Qizhi (44) (ed), The Negotiations Regarding Electoral Arrangements in Hong Kong in 1994-
95 (MkR4# 94-95 l (Hong Kong: Guangyu Press, 1994).
78 See Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, February 1994).
7 See Kuan Hsin-chi et al. (eds), The 1995 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996).
80 See Lei Jingxuan, "Evaluation of the Progress and Expected Consequences of Beijing's Strategy
of 'Establishing Another Stove"' (*64W "M t1dg{ " l in Tian Hongmao
(EBf034) (ed), The 1997 Transition and Taiwan-Hong Kong Relations (-A LA!A ftg *,)
(Taipei: Yeqiang, 1996), Ch 10.
81 See Kuan Hsin-chi et al. (eds), Power Transfer and Electoral Politics: The First Legislative Election in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999).
82 See Johannes Chan and Yash Ghai (eds), The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A Comparative Approach
(Hong Kong: Butterworths Asia, 1993).
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tive measure was part of the British Hong Kong Government's response to
the crisis of confidence in Hong Kong arising from the 4 June incident in
1989. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance translated into domestic law
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) which Britain had already applied to Hong Kong in 1976. Cor-
responding amendments were made to the Letters Patent, Hong Kong's
constitutional instrument.83 The Government conducted an extensive review
of all existing laws to identify which laws needed to be amended in order to
bring them in line with the Bill of Rights, and a number of amendments were
enacted. 4 Some new laws were also introduced to implement the Bill of Rights,
such as laws on anti-discrimination and on the privacy of personal data."5
Under the new constitutional regime, Hong Kong courts were empowered to
review and if necessary to strike down laws and administrative actions that
are inconsistent with the human rights guarantees in the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights or the ICCPR. Since 1991, a body of case law has developed in which
the Hong Kong courts have exercised this power of constitutional review,8 6 a
power available to CGJ under the ROC Constitution since 1947. After 1997,
the courts of Hong Kong have interpreted Article 39 of the Basic Law (on the
continued application of the ICCPR in Hong Kong) in such a manner as to
preserve the courts' power of constitutional review.17 Indeed, this review power
has since 1997 been extended to laws or actions which contravene provisions
of the Basic Law other than the human rights guarantees in the ICCPR.
When the Sino-British Joint Declaration was concluded in 1984 and Hong
Kong entered the era of rising consciousness of rights, the rule of law and
democracy and of heated debates on how the Basic Law should be drafted and
what Hong Kong's future constitutional order should be, Taiwan was still in
the era of authoritarianism. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, under the presid-
ency of Chiang Ching-kuo, dissidents were still subject to persecution,
8 These amendments sought to ensure that the laws of Hong Kong would be consistent with the
human rights standards set out in the ICCPR. See Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan (eds), Public
Law and Human Rights: A Hong Kong Sourcebook (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1993).
8 See Andrew Byrnes, "And Some Have Bills of Rights Thrust Upon Them: The Experience of Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights", in Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Com-
parative Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Ch 9 (p 318), at pp 342-348.
85 For example, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486), Sex Discrimination Ordinance
(Cap 480), Disability Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 487) etc.
86 See Byrnes (n 84 above); Yash Ghai, "Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Wolf's Clothing? Judicial
Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights" (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 459; Albert H.Y. Chen,
"The Interpretation of the Basic Law - Common Law and Mainland Chinese Perspectives" (2000)
30 HKLJ 380 at 418-420.
87 Important cases on this issue include HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442; Gurung Kesh
Bahadur v Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 480; Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8
HKCFAR 229, [2005] 3 HKLRD 164. Cases decided by Hong Kong courts discussed in this article are
available at the website of Hong Kong judiciary: http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk. See generally Albert
H.Y. Chen, "Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong" (2006) 15 Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal 627.
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prosecution and imprisonment, and anti-government publications were still
suppressed." For example, the "Kaohsiung Incident" of 1979 resulted in more
than a hundred dissidents being arrested and tens of them convicted and
imprisoned."9 Despite periodic crackdowns, the political opposition (then
called the "Tang-wai", which literally means "outside the Party (ie the
Kuomintang)") was gaining in strength. So was civil society, with many
social movements emerging and campaigning on issues such as labour, en-
vironment, consumers' rights, women's rights, etc.90 With the establishment
of full diplomatic relationship between the PRC and the USA in 1979 and
the US de-recognition of the Taipei ROC regime, Taiwan's isolation in the
international community was growing more serious than ever before. The
discussion about "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and the examples
of democratisation in the Philippines and South Korea probably also had
some impact upon Taiwan at the time. The Chiang Ching-kuo regime ulti-
mately decided to embark upon the road of political reform. Thus unlike the
constitutional movements in Hong Kong in the 1980s which flowed from the
joint decision of the PRC and Britain to change Hong Kong's future status,
constitutional reform in Taiwan in the 1980s was initiated by the govern-
ment in Taiwan itself. Nevertheless, the role of the opposition political forces
should not be under-estimated. Without their efforts, Taiwan's liberalisation
and democratisation would not probably have come in the way they did.
The reforms were launched by Chiang Ching-kuo not long before his
death.91 In March 1986, Chiang established a committee to look into issues
of political reform.12 In September 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) was formed in defiance of the existing law under which the formation
of new political parties was prohibited. However, the Government decided
not to take action against it. In July 1987, the martial law decree that had
been in force in Taiwan since May 1949 was lifted. This was followed by the
loosening of the existing restrictions on the formation of political parties, on
freedom of the press and of publication and on assemblies and demonstra-
tions.93 The termination of the martial law decree and the many regulations
and orders promulgated as part of the martial law regime resulted in a dra-
matic liberalisation of the political domain in Taiwan. Voices for freedom,
88 Roy (n 6 above), Ch 6; Ito (n 6 above), pp 310-316.
89 See The Kaohsiung Incident (A. **f[W ) (New York: Editorial Committee for the Special Collec-
tion on the Kaohsiung Incident, 1980).
90 See Chang Mau-kuei (VAR±), "Civil Society, Resource Mobilization, and New Social Movement:
Theoretical Inclinations for the Study of Social Movements in Taiwan" (K " ff* i M
RAMS-ib 494RF 1ER n), (1994) 4 Hong Kong]ournal of Social Sciences (4$
R # 1 ) 33.
91 See references cited in n 9 above.
92 Chao and Myers (n 9 above) at 143.
93 See Chao and Myers (n 9 above) at 152-168; Chen Xinmin (IWfR), On the Rule-of-Law State (IM
Nii$ft) (Taipei: Xuelin Culture, 2001) at 229ff.
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democracy and reform could be heard more loudly than ever before. Rather
suddenly, the level of civil liberties in Taiwan rose to a level close to that in
Hong Kong, though under the new National Security Law (1987) promul-
gated at the same time as the lifting of martial law, advocacy of communism
and of secession in assemblies or by civic associations was still prohibited.
In January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died, and Vice-President Lee Teng-
hui succeeded to the Presidency. There were power struggles within the
Kuomintang (KMT) but Lee won and became chairman of the KMT in July
1988. When his term of office as President for the remaining term of Chiang's
presidency expired in 1990, the National Assembly elected him as President
for another term (1990 to 1996). With his political power secured, Lee em-
barked upon the task of constitutional reform. However, under the ROC
Constitution, the National Assembly was the only state organ with the power
to amend the Constitution. As of 1990, three-fourths of the seats in the
National Assembly (766 out of 979) were still occupied by senior members
elected from the whole of China in 194794 who were allowed to stay in office
indefinitely on the pretext that it was impossible to hold any election in main-
land China (the remaining members being elected in Taiwan itself in
accordance with the amended Temporary Provisions mentioned above). Simi-
larly, senior members elected four decades ago still occupied the majority of
the seats in the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. Although a law to
encourage the voluntary retirement of these senior representatives was passed
in 1989, some of them still resisted the idea of retirement. The issue of the
retirement of senior members of the parliamentary institutions was referred
to the CGJ in 1991. In the most important decision ever made by the CGJ,
the GGJ in Interpretation No 261 (21 June 1990) declared that due to a
change in situation, Interpretation No 31 was no longer applicable, and re-
quired all senior members of the parliamentary institutions to retire by 31
December 1991 so that new elections could be held for all the seats in the
parliamentary institutions. This deadline in fact coincided with that stipu-
lated in the government's proposal for the retirement of the senior members."
Although Interpretation No 261 contemplated new elections and even
required that some of the seats should be reserved for "national representa-
tives" (ie representing the Republic of China as a whole rather than just
Taiwan), it did not address the constitutional mechanism for the purpose of
achieving this. Issues of constitutional reform were discussed in the National
Affairs Conference convened by President Lee in June/July 1990.96 The most
94 See Wen-Chen Chang, Transition to Democracy, Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism: Taiwan
in Comparative Constitutional Perspective (JSD dissertation, Yale Law School, 2001), pp 340, 359-360.
95 Ibid., p 365. See also Li Nianzu ( #1*), Constitutional Law Cases 1: Constitutional Principles and
Fundamental Human Rights (MOMJI: MgligA*,k JE F) (Taipei: Sanmin, 2002),
pp 5 2-62.
96 See Chao and Myers (n 9 above), Ch 9; Chiu (n 21 above), pp 34-37; Chiou (n 35 above), Ch 7.
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important issue was whether constitutional reform should proceed by way of
amending the Temporary Provisions, or abolishing the Temporary Provisions
and replacing them by other amendments to the Constitution, or enacting
an entirely new constitution. The making of a new constitution for Taiwan
was advocated by the DPP.
The KMT government ultimately decided to embark upon a two-stage
process for constitutional reform." The first stage was to be undertaken by
the existing National Assembly before the retirement of the senior members
by the end of 1991 as required by the CGJ. This stage would only involve the
abolition of the Temporary Provisions and the making of new provisions for
the election of the parliamentary institutions. The second stage was to be
conducted by the new National Assembly to be elected in December 1991,
which would then deal with substantive revisions to the constitution. The
KMT government also made the crucial decision that the constitutional re-
form would leave the text of the ROC Constitution intact. While the
Temporary Provisions were to be abolished, new amendments to the ROC
Constitution would take the form of Additional Articles appended to the
Constitution rather than the substitution of specific provisions in the text of
the Constitution. Thus the continuity and identity of the ROC regime would
be preserved to the maximum extent in the midst of constitutional reform.
Accepting the constitutional authority of the CGJ and abiding by its
Interpretation No 261, the National Assembly proved to be cooperative and
duly enacted 10 Additional Articles to the Constitution in April 1991 in the
first stage of the constitutional reform. At the same time, the Temporary Pro-
visions were abolished and the "Period of National Mobilization to Suppress
the Communist Rebellion" came to an end. The first-ever election to all the
seats of the (second-term) National Assembly was duly held in December
1991. In this election, the KMT achieved a landslide victory against the DPP
(which advocated Taiwanese independence) and won more than three quar-
ters of the seats (which was the majority required to pass constitutional
amendments)." The second-term National Assembly proceeded to the sec-
ond stage of constitutional reform. In 1992, eight Additional Articles were
enacted. The roles of the Control and Examination Yuans in the five-Yuan
constitutional system were re-defined; the term of office of the President was
changed to four years. One of the most important provisions in the new
Additional Articles was that when the term of office of the current President
expired in 1996, the next President was to be elected by the people of Tai-
wan. However, it was not settled whether the President was to be elected
9 See Chen (n 19 above) at 943-947; Chiu (n 21 above), pp 37-39.
98 See Chiu (n 21 above), pp 41-42; Chao and Myers (n 9 above) at 245-248; Roy (n 6 above),
pp 2 5 6-258.
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directly by universal suffrage, or indirectly through an electoral college. There
was still a difference of opinion within the KMT on this issue, though the
DPP preferred direct election which would promote the collective identity of
the people of Taiwan."
Upon the election of the National Assembly in December 1991 and the
election of the Legislative Yuan in December 1992 both by universal suffrage,
Taiwan could be said to have achieved a degree of democratisation that not
only surpasses what Hong Kong achieved in the 1990s but also surpasses what
is possible under the Hong Kong Basic Law before the ultimate destination of
universal suffrage for the election of all the seats in the legislature is achieved
at an indefinite future point of time. Just as the liberalisation of the late 1980s
enabled Taiwan to catch up with Hong Kong in the domain of civil liberties
where Taiwan had lagged behind Hong Kong for decades, the democratisation
of the early 1990s was so rapid that it put Taiwan at least two decades ahead
of Hong Kong in terms of democracy (as Beijing had in 2004 ruled out direct
election to all the seats in the Hong Kong legislature in 2008,100 the earliest
possible time at which this may be achieved is now 2012, but judging from
the present political climate it is unlikely that this will be achieved in Hong
Kong in 2012).
The constitutional amendments of 1991 and 1992 were however only the
beginning of the process of gradual, peaceful and incremental constitutional
change in Taiwan in the 1990s which has achieved what has been called a
"silent revolution".101 A third constitutional amendment was introduced by
the second-term National Assembly in 1994. The fourth, fifth and sixth con-
stitutional amendments were introduced by the third-term National Assembly
(elected in 1996) in 1997, 1999 and 2000 (the 1999 amendment being struck
down by the CGJ). The last and seventh amendment was introduced in 2005
by a National Assembly specially elected for the purpose. 102
The most important provision in the third amendment in 1994103 was on
the direct election of the President by universal suffrage in Taiwan as from
1996. The amendment also reorganised and consolidated the 18 Additional
Articles introduced in 1991/1992 into 10 Additional Articles. Presiden-
tial power was enhanced to some extent by this amendment. The fourth
99 See Chiu (n 21 above), pp 42-44; Chao and Myers (n 9 above), Ch 11; Roy (n 6 above), pp 259-260.
100 See Albert H.Y. Chen, "The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004" (2004) 34 HKLJ 215;
Johannes Chan and Lison Harris (eds), Hong Kong's Constitutional Debates (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Law Journal Limited, 2005).
101 Many commentators used this term. See, eg, Li Denghui (WWW), Taiwan's Opinions (4#(Ri )_
(Taipei: Yuanliu, 1999), pp 162-163; Ye (n 24 above), pp 17, 255, 259, 267.
102 For an overview of various constitutional amendments and general comments, see Chen (n 19 above),
s48.
103 See Li Bingna ( Mlt), Uncertain Constitutionalism: The Third Stage of Constitutional Reform (4f
n*9 : A &ti&tV2UFR) (Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998).
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amendment in 1997, enacted by a new National Assembly in which the KMT
no longer controlled a three quarters majority, was based on consensus
arrived at between the KMT and the DPP in the second National Affairs
Conference in 1996.10 It is highly significant in moving the existing political
system (which was a hybrid system with features of both parliamentary and
presidential systems) closer to a presidential system. The amendment also
abolished popular elections to the office of the Governor of the Taiwan Pro-
vince (introduced by the 1992 constitutional amendment) so that the original
distinction between the central government of the ROC and the provincial
government of Taiwan loses significance. The fifth amendment was also
intended to implement bipartisan consensus105 - this time on the diminution
of the significance of the National Assembly relative to the Legislative Yuan.
The amendment suffered from procedural defects and substantive unreason-
ableness and was struck down by the CGJ (in Interpretation No 499 in March
2000).106 The National Assembly hastily responded by introducing the sixth
amendment in April 2000 which effectively abolished the National Assem-
bly as a standing institution when the term of the third-term Assembly expired.
Finally, the seventh and last amendment to date in June 2005 completely
abolished the National Assembly and transferred its power of constitu-
tional amendment to the Legislative Yuan acting jointly with the people at a
referendum.
In 1997, Hong Kong came under a new constitutional order governed by
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR. By the time the fourth amendment to
the ROC Constitution was passed in Taiwan in the same year, a new consti-
tutional order had also come into existence in Taiwan. In both constitutional
orders, elements of the old and the new co-existed, both "backward legality"
and "forward legitimacy"1 o7 were strangely intertwined, and both continuity
and change were skilfully integrated. Although the Hong Kong Basic Law is
a new creation, it attempts to preserve Hong Kong's pre-existing laws, social
and economic systems, and even to some extent its semi-democratised politi-
cal system. Although the text of the old ROC Constitution has been left
intact and still constitutes the foundation of the constitutional order in Tai-
wan, the Additional Articles grafted on to it have breathed a completely new
life into it, and have been adapted to become a constitution for the operation
of a government of, by and for the people of Taiwan.
104 See Roy (n 6 above), pp 280-282; Jih-wen Lin, "Transition through Transaction: Taiwan's Constitu-
tional Reforms in the Lee Teng-hui Era" (2002) 20 American Asian Review 123, 148-150.
105 See Lin, ibid., pp 150-152.
106 See Li (n 95 above), pp 66-95, 177-209.
107 These two concepts are borrowed from Chang Wen-chen, Transition to Democracy, Constitutionalism
and Judicial Activism: Taiwan in Comparative Constitutional Perspective (unpublished SJD dissertation,
Yale, 2001), pp 354, 412, 518, which draw on Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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4. Constitutional Interpretation in Hong Kong and Taiwan
An important component of the practice of constitutionalism is the interpre-
tation and implementation of the constitutional text. Although government
agencies and officials and the legislature are actually involved in the interpre-
tation and implementation of the constitution in their daily activities, in
most legal systems the courts of law or constitutional courts are the most
authoritative interpreters of the constitution, and the constitutional juris-
prudence they develop through the accumulation of case law enables the text
of the constitution to be enriched and adapted to the changing needs of soci-
ety. Thus if a constitution may be conceived of as a living tree, the judiciary
as authoritative interpreters of the constitution are largely responsible for the
healthy growth of the tree. It is therefore right that the judiciary is often
referred to as the guardian of the constitution. This guardianship role has
been consciously assumed by courts in both Hong Kong and Taiwan in the
last one to two decades.
A comparative study of the cases or (in the case of Taiwan) interpreta-
tions decided by the courts (or the CGJ in the case of Taiwan) in Hong Kong
and Taiwan can reveal much about the practice of constitutionalism in these
territories. However, before any such study is undertaken, the difference in
the institutional structure of the system of constitutional review and inter-
pretation in the two territories should be borne in mind. Hong Kong's system
of constitutional review is similar to that in common law jurisdictions with a
written constitution such as Australia, India, Canada and the USA."o0 Con-
stitutional review is decentralised in the sense that any court in the judicial
system may in the course of deciding a case before it review whether a law,
regulation or administrative action relevant to the case is constitutional and
valid. Taiwan under the ROC Constitution practices centralised constitu-
tional review. Only the CGJ may perform the task of constitutional review.109
Historically speaking,110 at first the review may only be initiated by a govern-
ment organ petitioning to the CGJ. The Law on the Council of Grand Justices
of the Judicial Yuan enacted in 1958 made it possible for individual citizens
108 See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971);
Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
109 Arguably ordinary courts also engage in constitutional review to some extent, when they decide to
apply a law which they consider to be consistent with the Constitution, or decide to refer the ques-
tion of whether a law is constitutional to the CGJ. However, ordinary courts may not refuse to apply
a law in a case on the ground that it is unconstitutional. For an overview of the system of consti-
tutional review in Taiwan, see Lin Ziyi (##Tf) et al, Constitutional Law - Separation of Powers (*9-
-W4J ic) (Taipei: Xuelin Culture, 2003), Ch 2; Li Nianzu (###R), Constitutional Law
Cases II: The Procedure of Human Rights Protection (**J9III : A#%4tiWIP) (Taipei: Sanmin,
2003 ), pp 9 4-167.
110 See Materials on the History of Constitutional Interpretation by the Grand justices (AR'if 24)
(Taipei: Judicial Yuan, 1998).
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to petition for a constitutional interpretation after they have exhausted all
other legal remedies. The Law on the Procedure of Adjudication of the Council
of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan enacted in 1993 further broadened the
categories of petitioners for review to include, for example, legal entities other
than natural persons, and one-third of the members of the Legislative Yuan
acting jointly. Various interpretations made by the CGJ itself have also had
the effect of broadening access to the CGJ (eg judges in lower courts may
refer constitutional issues arising from cases being heard by them to the CGJ
and suspend the proceedings in the cases concerned pending the CGJ's inter-
pretation ..) and of expanding the scope of subject matter that it may review
(eg to include precedent cases of other courts").
Apart from the question of which court has the power of constitutional
review and interpretation, there are other important differences between the
system of constitutional review in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In Hong Kong, it
is not possible to for anyone to petition for constitutional interpretation as
such. A constitutional issue may only be dealt with by a court if it arises in
the context of a particular case (or, to use American terminology, a "case or
controversy") (eg a criminal case, a civil case, or a case involving judicial
review of administrative action). In Taiwan, a government organ or (after
1993) one-third of the members of the Legislative Yuan may petition the
CGJ requesting it to exercise its power of constitutional interpretation even
if no case has arisen in which a law alleged to be unconstitutional is being
applied. Thus the system in Taiwan is known as abstract constitutional re-
view (as distinguished from concrete constitutional review).113 Secondly, where
a law or regulation is challenged as unconstitutional, the CGJ may only de-
clare in the abstract whether the impugned provision is unconstitutional or
interpret the meaning of the relevant provisions in the Constitution. It has
no power to decide on how a particular law or provision in the Constitution
should be applied to the facts of a particular case." On the other hand, in
Hong Kong, the primary task of the court in deciding a case involving consti-
tutional law is to decide the case itself (eg whether the accused in a criminal
case is guilty as charged, whether an applicant for judicial review succeeds in
having an administrative action quashed, whether the plaintiff in a civil case
wins and is awarded damages), and the task of determining the constitution-
ality of a law or administrative action is only incidental to that of deciding
the case itself.
In See the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 371 (1995) and 572 (2004). The CGJ's Interpretations discussed
in this article are available at its website: http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt.
112 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 153 (1978), 154 (1978), 177 (1982), 185 (1984), 375 (1995).
113 See references cited in n 109 above.
114 Lin (n 109 above), p 39.
(2007) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 37 Hong Kong L.J. 672 2007
Constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan 673
In one sense, the range of constitutional cases considered by the Taiwan
CGJ is broader than that considered by the Hong Kong courts, and yet in
another sense it is narrower. It is broader in the sense that constitutional
issues may be raised in the abstract even if no concrete "case or controversy"
has arisen in which the issues are raised. A purely "academic" question re-
garding whether a provision in a law is unconstitutional or how a provision in
the Constitution should be interpreted may be brought before the CGJ by, for
example, one-third of the legislators.' Furthermore, upon a petition for in-
terpretation, the actual interpretation made by the CGJ need not be confined
to the legal issues raised by the petition, but the CGJ may on its own initia-
tive deal with other related issues on which it considers appropriate to express
its views authoritatively in the form of a constitutional interpretation. 116 On
the other hand, as far as petitions by individuals are concerned (individuals
may petition the CGJ after other remedies have been exhausted), only a small
proportion of such petitions are actually entertained by the CGJ and decided
upon in the form of a constitutional interpretation. The great majority of
individuals' petitions are dismissed without any interpretation being issued
one way or the other."' This can be contrasted with the Hong Kong system,
under which if a constitutional issue is raised in a case being tried before a
court and the issue is relevant to the case, the court must pronounce judg-
ment on the issue.
This article will consider the actual record of constitutional cases or inter-
pretations in Hong Kong and Taiwan. As mentioned above, until the
enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, Hong Kong's
colonial constitution was rudimentary and contained few provisions on rights
or on checks and balances as between government organs. There was thus
little scope for constitutional litigation. The leading pre-Bill of Rights cases
on Hong Kong constitutional law involved issues such as (a) whether pro-
ceedings on a bill introduced in the Legislative Council should be stopped
because, given the subject matter of the bill, its introduction violated the
provisions of the Royal Instructions (being part of Hong Kong's colonial con-
stitution),118 (b) whether a law and related government action affecting land
115 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretation No 328 (1993) on the question of the meaning or scope of "the
territory" of the ROC under the ROC Constitution. The CGJ, relying on the "political question
doctrine", declined to answer the question. See Li (n 109 above) at 168-181. Other examples in-
clude Interpretations Nos 76 (1957) and 364 (1994).
116 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretation No 445 (1998). See also Thomas Weishing Huang, "Judicial Activ-
ism in the Transitional Polity: The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan"(2005) 19 Temple International
and Comparative Law Journal 1, 29 (n 181) and 53.
117 For statistics about the CGJ, including the number of petitions and interpretations, see Materials on
the History of Constitutional Interpretation by the GrandJustices (n 110 above) at 477-511; Wen-Chen
Chang, "The Role of Judicial Review in Consolidating Democracies: The Case of Taiwan" (2005) 2
Asia Law Review 73.
118 Rediffusion v Attorney General [1970] AC 1136.
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rights in the New Territories was invalid because it was contrary to the provi-
sions of the treaty by which the New Territories were leased to Britain,119 (c)
whether the appointment of magistrates was invalid because the appoint-
ment was made by the Chief Justice purportedly under power delegated to
him by the Governor whereas (it was argued that) there had not been any
valid and effective delegation under the colonial constitution, 120 and (d)
whether the Government had the lawful authority under the Civil Service
Regulations and Colonial Regulations to suspend without pay civil servants
who went on strike.12' These cases illustrate that though the scope for consti-
tutional litigation was limited under the colonial constitution, the rule of law
was taken seriously and litigants were willing to take matters to the courts
(whose independence they had confidence in) and to challenge government
actions as unconstitutional. This is not to mention that even before the
enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1991,122 there was a long tradition of adminis-
trative law litigation in Hong Kong in which citizens challenged (sometimes
successfully and sometimes not) administrative actions as unlawful or chal-
lenged subordinate legislation enacted by officials or organs acting under
delegated power as ultra vires (ie outside the scope of the power conferred by)
the relevant primary legislation (which provided for the delegation) and thus
null and void.
The enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991 inau-
gurated a new era of constitutional judicial review in Hong Kong. 123 Before
this time, although Hong Kong courts had in theory the power to strike down
legislation enacted by the local legislature on the ground that it was contrary
to the Letters Patent or other constitutional limitations on the power of the
colonial legislature, in practice no legislation had been struck down, because
there was little substantive content in the Letters Patent that could be used
to challenge legislation. After 1991, legislation could be challenged on Bill of
Rights grounds. The most celebrated case before the 1997 handover in which
the power of constitutional judicial review was exercised by the Hong Kong
courts was the case of R v Sin Yau-ming124 decided by the Court of Appeal in
1991. This case concerned the constitutional validity of a presumption for
the purpose of the law of evidence contained in the Dangerous Drugs Ordin-
119 Winfat Enterprise v Attorney General [1983] HKLR 211.
120 Attorney General v David Chiu Tat-cheong [1992] 2 HKLR 84.
121 Lam Yuk-ming v Attorney General [1980] HKLR 815.
122 See Peter Wesley-Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law in Hong Kong (n 15 above), Chs 16-
18; Jayawickrama (n 43 above); David Clark, Hong Kong Administrative Law (Singapore: Butterworths,
1989). On Hong Kong administrative law after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, see Peter Wesley-
Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Hong Kong: Longman Asia, 1995), Chs 8-9; David
Clark and Gerard McCoy, Hong Kong Administrative Law (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1993).
123 See Chan and Ghai (eds) (n 82 above); Albert H.Y. Chen, "The Interpretation of the Basic Law"
(2000) 30 HKLJ 380, 417-420.
124 (1991) 1 HKPLR 88, [1992] 1 HKCLR 127.
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ance. The presumption was that if the accused was found in possession of a
specified amount (0.5 grams) of dangerous drugs, it would be presumed that
they possessed it for the purpose of trafficking (possession for the purpose of
trafficking was a more serious crime than mere possession) unless they could
prove otherwise. The court referred extensively to overseas jurisprudence (par-
ticularly Canadian jurisprudence) - which was a rare practice in the past
when Hong Kong courts relied almost exclusively on English and Hong Kong
case law - and struck down the presumption as contrary to the presumption
of innocence in the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR. Since this case, other
similar presumptions in Hong Kong legislation placing the onus to disprove
certain presumed facts on the accused have also been challenged and some-
times struck down. Most cases on the Bill of Rights were in the domain of
criminal law and procedure. Other leading cases have touched upon the free-
dom of the press, the freedom of assembly, the right to vote, and the right to
stand as a candidate in an election.125
On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was reunified with China and became a Spe-
cial Administrative Region of the PRC. The Basic Law came into force. As
mentioned above, the implementation of the Basic Law actually broadened
the scope for constitutional litigation in Hong Kong and enhanced the role
of the Hong Kong judiciary - now led by the newly established Court of Final
Appeal which replaced the Privy Council in London as the top appellate
court in Hong Kong1 26 - as guardian of the constitution or the Basic Law.
Rights that were enshrined in the Basic Law itself but not in the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights or the ICCPR came to be litigated for the first time before the
Hong Kong courts. These newly litigated rights include, for example, the
right of abode in Hong Kong, 17 the right to travel, 128 the right of indigenous
inhabitants in the New Territories, 129 and the right of civil servants not to be
subject to terms of service less favourable than before.130 As regards rights
125 See Byrnes (n 84 above); Ghai (n 86 above); Johannes M.M. Chan, "Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: Its
Reception of and Contribution to International and Comparative Jurisprudence" (1998) 47 ICLQ
306.
126 See the Basic Law, Arts 81-82 and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484). For
the background to the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal, see Lo Shiu Hing, "The Politics of
the Debate over the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong" (2000) 161 China Quarterly 221.
127 The most celebrated cases were the twin decisions of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) on 29 Jan
1999 in Ng Ka-ling v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, [1999] 1 HKLRD 315 and Chan
Kam-nga v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 82, [1999] 1 HKLRD 304. The Court of Final
Appeal's interpretations of two relevant provisions in the Basic Law in these cases were subsequently
overruled (prospectively and without the litigants in these cases being affected) by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress in exercise of its power to interpret the Basic Law
under Art 158, upon the request of the Hong Kong SAR Government. See Johannes M.M. Chan,
H.L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000).
128 See, eg, Bahadur (n 87 above); Official Receiver v Chan Wing Hing (2006) 9 HKCFAR 545, [2006] 3
HKLRD 687.
129 See, eg, Secretary for justice v Chan Wah (2000) 3 HKCFAR 459.
130 See, eg, Secretary for Justice v Lau Kwok Fai (2005) 8 HKCFAR 304; [2005] 3 HKLRD 88.
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which were already constitutionally entrenched before 1997, the Hong Kong
courts have also decided landmark cases on them after 1997, including cases
on freedom of expression,"' freedom of assembly,13 2 the right to political par-
ticipation,133 the right to equality and non-discrimination,"' the liberty of
the person"' and due process," 6 the right not to be subject to cruel and in-
human punishment,13 7 and, most recently, the right to privacy and freedom
from surveillance. 138
In the case of Taiwan, the system of constitutional review was developed
several decades earlier than in Hong Kong, as the ROC Constitution of 1946
contained elaborate provisions on separation of powers, checks-and-balances
and the protection of human rights, and established a constitutional court
(the CGJ) for the purpose of interpreting them. Although the CGJ did not
actually declare any law or regulation unconstitutional until 1980"' (except
that in Interpretation No 86 in 1960 it hinted that the arrangement whereby
the lower courts were administratively under the Ministry of Justice of the
Executive Yuan rather than the Judicial Yuan was unconstitutional, but the
interpretation was ignored by the Government 40) and did not effectively
invalidated any law or regulation' until 1986,142 it had steadily built up a
body of jurisprudence on matters such as the separation of powers and gradu-
ally consolidated its position and authority in the legal and political system.
The extraordinary potential of this latent institutional capacity and capital
was revealed in Interpretation No 261 in the grand historical moment of
constitutional reform as discussed above. In fact, even before this interpreta-
tion, the CGS had already started to become activist with the liberalisation
of the political climate in the late 1980s.
After Interpretation No 261 in which the CGJ proved to be able to play a
crucial role in facilitating Taiwan's political and constitutional transforma-
tion, the "golden age" arrived for the CGJ's role in promoting legal reform,
131 See, eg, HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (n 87 above).
132 See, eg, Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (n 87 above).
133 Chan Shu Ying v Chief Executive of the HKSAR [2001] 1 HKLRD 405.
134 See, eg, Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690.
135 See, eg, Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 381.
136 See Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited v New World Development Company Limited (2006) 9 HKCFAR
234; [2006] 2 HKLRD 518.
137 Lau Cheong v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415.
138 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441; [2006] 3 HKLRD 455. See also
text accompanying nn 165 and 167 below. See generally Chen (n 87 above).
139 See the CGJ's Interpretation No 166 (1980). In this Interpretation, CGJ hinted that provisions in
the Law on Offences Punishable by the Police which provided for punishments involving restrictions
on the liberty of the person was unconstitutional. See text accompanying n 150 below.
140 See Ye (n 24 above) at 278; Chang (n 94 above) at 234-236.
141 See Ye (n 24 above) at 282; Chang (n 94 above) at 307-308.
142 See the CGJ's Interpretation No 210 (1986); Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, "Judicial Review and Emerg-
ing Constitutionalism: The Uneasy Case for the Republic of China on Taiwan" (1991) 39 American
Journal of Comparative Law 509, 535 -536. Interpretation No 166 was not effective as it was ignored
by the Government.
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enhancing human rights, dismantling the authoritarian institutions of the
past and arbitrating the political conflicts within the revitalised political sys-
tem that was no longer controlled by a strongman or single political party.
Partly because the CGJ is a specialised agency for constitutional interpreta-
tion and its jurisdiction can be exercised in the abstract in the absence of any
case or controversy, partly because Taiwan (with a population of 23 million)
is a larger society than Hong Kong (with a population of seven million), and
partly because of the different legal, political and social environments in the
two societies, the number of constitutional interpretations by the CGJ far
surpasses the number of constitutional cases in Hong Kong.
One area of the law in Taiwan that has been reformed as a result of a
series of interpretations by the GGJ concerns the doctrine of special power
relationships inherited from Weimar Germany. This doctrine restricted,
for example, the right of civil servants to sue the government or the right of
students to sue the school. Starting from the mid- 1980s, the CGJ in a series of
interpretations 43 did much to dismantle this doctrine. In Hong Kong, which
practices the common law and has no specialised system of administrative
courts, there was never any legal principle equivalent to the doctrine of spe-
cial power relationship.
Another series of interpretations,' also beginning in the mid-1980s but
maturing in the 1990s, involved the rigorous application of the doctrine of
legislative reservation which was derived from German law. In the past, much
of Taiwan's legal norms were contained in administrative regulations, decrees
or orders promulgated by government agencies in pursuance of laws that were
drafted in vague terms and conferred on executive organs broad or unfettered
discretion. By applying strictly the doctrine of legislative reservation, the CGJ
has in the 1990s established that where constitutional rights (that may be
restricted by law) are affected by administrative instruments (such as instru-
ments authorising the imposition of administrative sanctions), the latter are
only valid if they are enacted in pursuance of a law that clearly and specifically
authorises the administrative agency concerned to promulgate an adminis-
trative instrument on the relevant subject matter and of the relevant scope.
In the case of Hong Kong, although there is no doctrine of legislative reserva-
tion, the application of the doctrine of ultra vires in the review of subordinate
legislation (promulgated by administrative agencies in pursuance of power
conferred by primary legislation enacted by the legislature) has a similar
effect.' The CGJ has identified in Article 23 of the Constitution the basis
143 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 187 (1984), 201 (1986), 243 (1989), 295 (1992), 298 (1992),
312 (1993), 323 (1993), 382 (1995), 430 (1997).
144 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 210 (1986), 217 (1987), 268 (1990), 313 (1993), 367 (1994),
394 (1996), 443 (1997), 566 (2003), 567 (2003).
145 See n 122 above.
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for the doctrine of legislative reservation.146 Article 23 provides that consti-
tutional rights may not be restricted by law except where necessitated by
certain specified grounds (such as the maintenance of social order, promotion
of the public interest, etc). It is interesting to note that Article 23 finds a
parallel in Article 39 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which provides that rights
and freedoms "shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law", and such
restrictions should not contravene the ICCPR. The Hong Kong courts' inter-
pretation of this provision comes close to that adopted by the CGJ on Article
23 of the ROC Constitution in that they emphasise that constitutional rights
may not be restricted by mere executive orders,1 7 and that the law that re-
stricts such rights must satisfy the requirements of legal certainty and
predictability"' in addition to the principle of proportionality."'
Some of the interpretations of the CGJ with the greatest impact concern
the protection of the liberty of the person (the subject of an elaborate provi-
sion in Article 18 of the ROC Constitution) and the criminal process. In
Interpretation No 251 (1990) (affirming Interpretation No 166 of 1980) the
CGJ declared as unconstitutional provisions in the Law on Offences Punish-
able by the Police (enacted before the ROC Constitution itself was enacted)
which authorised the police to arrest, detain and impose punishments (in-
cluding compulsory labour or reformatory education) for minor crimes without
resorting to a judicial process. In this case, the CGJ stipulated a deadline of
one and a half year for the law to be changed.I In Interpretation No 384
(1995), the CGJ declared as contrary to due process and unconstitutional
several provisions of the Law for the Eradication of Gangsters which empow-
ered the police to classify a person as a "gangster" (liumang) (which
classification could not be challenged by administrative litigation), to arrest
them without a judicial warrant, to rely on "secret witnesses" (whose identity
would not be revealed to the alleged gangster and against whom they did not
have the right of confrontation) and to sentence them to "rehabilitation".
The CGJ again gave a grace period of one and a half year for the law to be
reformed. 151 In Interpretation No 392 (1995), the CGJ declared as unconsti-
tutional key provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure which authorised
the procurators (ie prosecutors) to detain suspects for two months (with pos-
sible extensions) without the court's approval, a practice that had been followed
146 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 313 (1993), 394 (1996), 567(2003).
147 See Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (n 138 above), and text accompanying nn 165 and
167 below.
14 See Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (n 135 above).
149 See HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (n 87 above).
150 Unlike the CGJ's Interpretation No 166 on the same subject matter, Interpretation No 251 was
complied with by the Government. The law was reformed in 1991 with the enactment of the Law on
the Maintenance of Social Order.
151 The law was reformed in 1996.
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by the ROC authorities for more than half a century.15 2 These Interpretations
led to substantial law reforms in the domain of criminal procedure. In Hong
Kong, however, practices similar to those outlawed by the CGJ in Taiwan
have not existed, so there was no opportunity or need for Hong Kong courts
to deal with issues of personal liberty similar to those dealt with in these
interpretations.
Several other interpretations in the field of education also concern prac-
tices which have not existed in Hong Kong and thus need not be struck down
by the Hong Kong courts. In Interpretation No 380 (1995), the CGJ de-
clared as contrary to the principle of legislative reservation provisions of the
Enforcement Rules of the University Law which required all students in all
universities to take and pass a common set of prescribed courses. In Interpre-
tation No 450 (1998), the CGJ declared as contrary to the constitutional
protection of academic freedom provisions in the University Law requiring
all universities to establish offices of military training in order to provide mili-
tary training courses. In Interpretation No 373 (1995), the CGJ declared as
contrary to the constitutional protection of the freedom of association a pro-
hibition in the Trade Unions Law on technical workers (not being teachers)
in the education industry to form trade unions. In Hong Kong, the leading
constitutional law case in the domain of education was Equal Opportunities
Commission v Director of Education.1 3 In this case, the High Court declared as
contrary to the right to equality and non-discrimination a long-standing prac-
tice adopted by the Government's Education Department relating to entrance
to secondary schools of adjusting the examination marks of boys and girls.
The adjustment resulted in a boy's chances of getting into a preferred second-
ary school being better than a girl's where the boy and girl achieved equal
marks. The practice was originally designed to achieve a more equal propor-
tion of male to female students in the best secondary schools in Hong Kong
(given that the marks of girls at the end of their primary school education
were generally higher than those boys of the same age).
In the field of freedom of speech, the CGJ in Interpretation No 509 (2001)
upheld the provision in the Criminal Code making defamation punishable as
a criminal offence.154 It is interesting to note in this regard that after the
enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, the Hong Kong Government
reviewed all existing laws as to their compatibility with the Bill and intro-
duced amendments to address issues of incompatibility. In this law reform
exercise, the existing Hong Kong law on criminal punishment for defamatory
152 This time the CGJ allowed a grace period of 2 years for the law to be reformed. The interpretation led
to substantial changes in the law of criminal procedure in Taiwan.
153 [2001] 2 HKLRD 690.
154 For other interpretations in the field of freedom of speech, see, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 407,
414 and 577.
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libel was partly repealed."' The leading post-1997 Hong Kong case on the
civil law of defamation was Cheng v Tse Wai-chun.116 In this case, the Court of
Final Appeal extended the defence of fair comment (on matters of public
interest) to situations where the defendant was motivated by personal or pri-
vate interests when he made the defamatory statement. The decision thus
expanded the scope of freedom of expression in Hong Kong. 157
One of the most celebrated decisions of the CGJ in the domain of human
rights is Interpretation No 445 (1998) which concerns freedoms of assembly,
demonstration and expression. Here the CGJ reviewed the Law on Assembly
and Parades. It upheld the requirement of prior permission for demonstra-
tions, but struck down (as contrary to the constitutional protection of freedom
of expression) the proposed advocacy of communism or secession during the
demonstration as a ground for denying permission for it to go ahead. The
CGJ also struck down the power to deny permission for a demonstration on
the basis of the risk (not amounting to clear and present danger) of the dem-
onstration endangering national security, social order or the public interest,
or endangering persons' life, bodily integrity or liberty or causing severe dam-
age to property, holding that these grounds failed to satisfy the requirements
of legal precision and certainty and of the proportionality test. It also held
that as far as spontaneous demonstrations were concerned, it was unreason-
able to require permission to be applied for two days in advance.
Interpretation No 445 can be usefully compared to three leading cases
decided by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal on the freedom of assembly
and expression. In Leung Kwok-hung v HKSAR, 5  the CFA (like the CGJ)
upheld the requirement of prior notification of the authorities for assemblies
or demonstrations, but (like the CGJ) struck down one of the several grounds
for refusing to allow a demonstration to take place or for imposing restric-
tions on it. The ground struck down was that of "ordre public" (a term in the
ICCPR and copied into Hong Kong's Public Order Ordinance), which the
CFA considered to be too broad and imprecise to satisfy the requirement of
legal certainty and predictability. However, unlike the CGJ, the CFA upheld
the grounds (for refusing to allow a demonstration to take place or for impos-
155 The criminal offences of defamatory libel were originally provided for in ss 5 and 6 of the Defamation
Ordinance (Cap 21). Section 6 was repealed (see Ord No 68 of 1995), but s 5 has been retained.
However, prosecutions for defamatory libel are almost unheard of, so the constitutionality of s 5 has
not been challenged. The original s 6 criminalized defamatory libel by providing that any person who
maliciously published any defamatory libel was liable to imprisonment for one year and to pay such
fines as the court may award; and s 5 provides that any person who maliciously publishes any defama-
tory libel, knowing the same to be false, shall be liable to imprisonment for two years, and, in addition,
to pay such fine as the court may award (emphasis added).
156 Cheng v Tse Wai Chun (2000) 3 HKCFAR 339; [2000] 3 HKLRD 418.
157 This decision also contributed to the development of the relevant jurisprudence in the common law
world. See Denis Chang, "Has Hong Kong Anything Special or Unique to Contribute to the Con-
temporary World of Jurisprudence?" (2000) 39 HKLJ 347.
5 (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229; [2005] 3 HKLRD 164.
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ing restrictions on it) relating to public order (in the "law and order" sense of
prevention of disorder), public safety and national security. At the same time,
the court held that concrete decisions or actions by the police prohibiting or
restricting demonstrations on these grounds are subject to judicial review on
the basis of the principle of proportionality. In Yeung May-wan v HKSAR159
(which concerned a demonstration staged by Falun Gong activists outside
the Liaison Office of the Chinese Central Government in Hong Kong), the
CFA quashed all the convictions by the lower courts on the ground that
the obstruction caused by the demonstration (which was the main offence
with which the demonstrators were charged) was not of such an extent as to
amount to unreasonable use of the pavement having regard to the right to
peaceful assembly and demonstration. In HKSAR v Ng Kung-siu (the "flag
desecration" case), 160 the CFA reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal
and held that the flag desecration law passed the proportionality test and was
not an excessive and unconstitutional restriction on freedom of expression.
There are a number of interpretations in which the CGJ reviewed the
severity of the criminal punishment imposed for certain crimes, including the
death penalty and life imprisonment.161 In Hong Kong, the death penalty had
not been carried out since 1970s 162 and was formally abolished in 1993.163 In
Lau Cheong v HKSAR,164 the prisoner challenged the mandatory life impri-
sonment for convicted murderers (which in practice however can allow for
early release of the prisoner) as an unconstitutional restriction on liberty of
the person and as cruel and inhuman punishment. The CFA deferred to the
judgment of the legislature on this matter of penal policy and upheld the
relevant law.
One of the recent CGJ interpretations of great jurisprudential significance
is Interpretation No 603 (2005), which invalidated the requirement to pro-
duce fingerprints in applying for an identity card. Fingerprinting has been
required in Hong Kong's similar system of identity cards, but the rule has not
been challenged by groups in civil society, not to mention being litigated in
the courts. However, in this domain of privacy, recent Hong Kong cases (since
2005) have questioned the constitutionality of covert surveillance by law
enforcement authorities (by, example, audiovisual recording) and telephone
interception. Leung Kwok-hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR 165 declared
159 (2005) 8 HKCFAR 137; [2005] 2 HKLRD 212.
160 See n 87 above.
161 See, eg, the CGJ's Interpretations Nos 194 (1985), 263 (1990), 471 (1998), 476 (1999), 512 (2000),
528 (2001), 544 (2002) and 551 (2002).
162 See Athena Liu, "The Right to Life", in Raymond Wacks (ed), Human Rights in Hong Kong (Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), Ch 7.
163 See Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 1993.
164 (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415.
165 Unrep., HCAL 107/2005 (Hartmann J, Court of First Instance, 9 Feb 2006), available at http://
legalref.judiciary.gov.hk.
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the relevant law and executive order in this regard to be unconstitutional,
and, for the first time in Hong Kong's legal history (though this is a practice
frequently used by the CGJ in Taiwan since the late 1980s),166 gave a grace
period (of 6 months) for the Government to amend the law. 167
In the domain of property rights, the CGJ has been active at an earlier
stage of its history than in the domain of civil and political rights, and has
developed an elaborate jurisprudence containing many important principlesl68
which subsequently found their application in the domain of civil and politi-
cal rights. 169 This jurisprudence is based directly on the ROC Constitution,
which provides expressly for the protection of property rights (Article 15). In
the case of Hong Kong, there were no provisions on property rights either in
the colonial constitution or in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. How-
ever, the Basic Law does provide explicitly for the protection of property rights
and requires full compensation for the deprivation of private property for
public purpose (Articles 6 and 105).170 A few cases have been litigated since
1997 on the constitutional protection of property rights,' but their number
and impact pale in comparison with the interpretations of the CGJ on prop-
erty rights.
Some of the most well-known interpretations of the CGJ address political
conflicts which were referred to the court for resolution. This is an area in
which there is no corresponding Hong Kong case law. Although the relation-
ship between the legislature and the executive in Hong Kong has not been
166 See Ye (n 24 above), Ch 8.
167 See Leung Kwok Hung v Chief Executive of the HKSAR, unrep., CACV 73/2006 (Court of Appeal, 10
May 2006); Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441, [2006] 3 HKLRD
455 (Koo and Leung are different names of the same case, as both Koo and Leung were the applicants
in the original action for judicial review. The Court of Final Appeal agreed that the government and
the legislature should be given 6 months to amend the relevant laws. However, unlike the lower
courts, the Court of Final Appeal refused to declare that the relevant laws were still valid during
these 6 months. It only held that the declaration that these laws were unconstitutional would
be suspended. The declaration would only be brought into effect six months from the date of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance. This means that although the government would not
be in breach of the declaration made by the court in this case by acting under those laws, the govern-
ment is not shielded from legal liability for functioning pursuant to what has been declared
unconstitutional.
168 See Su Yongqin (9*C)0, Constitutional Review (1 I ) (Taipei: Xuelin Culture, 1999), pp 75ff;
Chen Ai'e (NI#), "The Evolution of the Right to Property in the Interpretations of the Council
of Grand Justices", in Liu Kongzhong VIALP) and Li Jianliang ( Elt) (eds), The Theory and
Practice of Constitutional Interpretation (*XNZ3E* IM) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Insti-
tute of Social Sciences, 1998), pp 393 ff.
169 See Ye (n 24 above) at 284, 292.
170 See Albert H.Y. Chen, "The Basic Law and the Protection of Property Rights" (1993) 23 HKLJ 31.
171 See Kowloon Poultry Laan Merchants Association v Director of Agriculture Fisheries and Conservation
[2002] 4 HKC 277; Yook Tong Electric Company Limited v Commissioner for Transport, unrep., HCAL
94/2002 (Hartmann J, Court of First Instance, 7 Feb 2003); Kaisilk Development Ltd v Urban Renewal
Authority [2004] 1 HKLRD 907; Fine Tower Associates Ltd v Town Planning Board [2006] 2 HKC 507;
Fine Tower Associated Ltd v Town Planning Board [2006] 4 HKLRD 347; Harvest Good Development
Limited v Secretary for Justice, unrep., HCAL 32/2006 (Hartman J, Court of First Instance, 16 July
2007).
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cordial in recent years (and as in the case of Taiwan after 2000, in recent
years the Hong Kong Government could not easily secure LegCo's support
for controversial bills and policies, and on some occasions LegCo had de-
bated or even passed non-binding motions of no confidence or censure on
individual Government officials), 172 the courts of Hong Kong have not had
the opportunity to address issues similar or comparable to those in the follow-
ing CGJ interpretations. In Interpretation 387 (1995), the CGJ declared that
the Premier must resign when the Legislative Yuan was re-elected. In Inter-
pretation No 419 (1996), the CGJ dealt with the issue of whether the
Vice-President could simultaneously occupy the office of Premier. In Inter-
pretation No 520 (2001), the CGJ considered the consequences of the
Executive Yuan not proceeding with the construction of a nuclear power plant
even though the Legislative Yuan had already approved the budget for it. In
Interpretation No 499 (2000), the CGJ went so far as to declare as unconsti-
tutional and invalid the fifth amendment of the Constitution introduced by
the National Assembly. In Interpretation No 585 (2004), the CGJ examined
the validity of a law giving a Legislative Yuan committee a range of powers
to investigate the gun shooting incident on the day (19 March) before
the Presidential election of 2004 in which President Chen Shui-bian and
Vice-President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien were injured while campaigning for
re-election. And in Interpretation No 613 (2006), the CGJ held that the
Organic Law of the National Communications Commission was unconstitu-
tional, as it in effect deprived the Executive Yuan of decision-making power
in personnel matters.
As mentioned above, the Hong Kong courts have since Sin Yau-ming be-
gan to refer to a wide range of jurisprudential sources in their judgments.
These include the case law of common law jurisdictions elsewhere, the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights, materials generated by the United
Nations framework for the protection of human rights, and scholarly writings
on international human rights law.173 The range of sources referred to by the
CGJ is even broader, which can partly be explained by the diverse educa-
tional backgrounds of the Taiwan Grand Justices.1 14 In Hong Kong, all judges
are trained in the English common law tradition. Scholars do not sit as judges;
when the CFA hears a case, one of the five judges may be an invited judge
172 For discussion on the relation between the executive and the legislature in Hong Kong after 1997, see
Li Pang Kwong, "The Executive-Legislature Relationship in Hong Kong", in Joseph Y.S. Cheng (ed),
Political Development in the HKSAR (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2001), Ch 4; Ma
Ngok, "Executive-Legislative Relations: Assessing Legislative Influence in an Executive-Dominant
System", in Lau Siu-kai (ed), The First Tung Administration (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2002), Ch 14. For the developing political system in post-1997 Hong Kong, see generally Albert H.Y.
Chen, "The Basic Law and the Development of the Political System in Hong Kong" (2007) 15 Asia
Pacific Law Review 19.
173 See Chan (n 125 above).
174 See Huang (n 116 above), pp 5, 15-16.
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from a common law jurisdiction (in practice usually Britain and Australia)."'
The CGJ consists of both career judges and scholars of the law. Unlike the
case in Hong Kong, many Taiwan Grand Justices have doctoral degrees in
law. Some are trained in the common law tradition and some in continental
European law, particularly German law.1 6 It is now not uncommon for the
CGJ in its interpretations and reasoning to refer to or quote directly sources
in English, German and Japanese,"' even though the main body of the inter-
pretation or reasoning is in Chinese. In Hong Kong, English is still the language
in which most judgments of the higher courts is written. The judgments of
the CFA are all written in English, although a small number of them have
been translated into Chinese.17 1
Both the Hong Kong courts and the CGJ in Taiwan have risen to the
challenge of constitutional interpretation in the last one to two decades. Both
have won respect in their respective societies as trustworthy guardians of the
constitution. In Hong Kong, there has since the 1970s been a high degree of
trust in the judiciary in general."' In Taiwan, historically there seems to have
been a lack of trust in the courts,1s0 but the CGJ has definitely in the course of
the last two decades won the trust and esteem of the people of Taiwan, and
particularly the legal and political elite.' The roles of the courts in Hong
Kong and the CGJ in Taiwan have both been enhanced by constitutional
and political developments in the last two decades. In Hong Kong, the cata-
lyst for judicial activism was first the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and then the
coming into force of the Basic Law. In Taiwan, the bill of rights in the ROC
Constitution that had lain dormant in the era of martial law and "national
mobilization to suppress the communist rebellion" has been revitalised by the
CGJ in the new era of liberalisation and democratisation, and aggressively
used to remove the vestiges of authoritarianism and to promote legal reform
to enhance human rights and dignity.
There were more cases in Taiwan than in Hong Kong in which the courts
(the ordinary courts in Hong Kong and the CGJ in Taiwan) struck down laws
175 Article 82 of the Basic Law provides that the Court of Final Appeal "may as required invite judges
from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal." These invited judges are
called Non-Permanent Judges, and include the former Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Anthony
Mason, who sat on most of the important constitutional cases before the Court of Final Appeal after
1997. For the background to the drafting of this article, see Lo Shiu Hing (n 126 above).
176 See Chen Junrong (M**), Grand justices (*I- ) (Taipei: Yangzhi Culture, 1999).
17 See Huang (n 116 above), p 16.
178 For discussion of the bilingual nature of Hong Kong's legal system, see Zhang Daming (4 Of)
"The Prospects of the Bilingualisation of Hong Kong Law" ( in Lu
Wenhui (O)UZ) (ed), Legal Translation (RM) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Bookstore, 2002).
179 See Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Chinese Uni-
versity Press, 1988), Ch 4; Berry Fong-Chung Hsu, The Common Law: In Chinese Context (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992).
180 See Tay-sheng Wang, "Taiwan", in Poh-ling Tan, Asian Legal Systems (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997),
p 124, at pp 153, 158.
See Su (n 24 above) at 271; Ye (n 24 above), Ch 7.
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and regulations on human rights grounds. This can at least be partly explained
by the fact that the general state of protection of human rights in Hong Kong
as of the 1980s was better than Taiwan's, and more laws and regulations were
in need of reform in Taiwan than Hong Kong as far as human rights were
concerned. In the domain of the operation of the political system and checks-
and-balances, the CGJ has been active while the Hong Kong courts have
not. This is explicable in terms of the increasing tensions and conflicts experi-
enced in Taiwan's political system as democratisation proceeded in the 1990s,
as contrasted with the situation in Hong Kong where although some such
tensions have also existed, they have not reached such a level as to require or
be susceptible to judicial resolution. The existence of the power of the Na-
tional People's Congress to interpret the Basic Law,182 which it has used on
two of the three occasions for the exercise of the powerl83 to clarify or supple-
ment the meaning of the text of the Basic Law on the operation and
development of Hong Kong's political system, has also served to avoid judi-
cial resolution of such issues in Hong Kong.
5. Concluding Reflections
It has been suggested in the introduction to this article that both Hong Kong
and Taiwan have been important sites of constitutional experimentation in
Asia in the last two decades. This article has sought to tell the story of these
constitutional experiments and the experience and the struggles of the people
of Hong Kong and Taiwan in using constitutional thinking and practices for
the purpose of securing a better future for themselves and their children. In
the world of human affairs, meaning is humanly constructed, and actions are
meaningful only insofar as they contribute to the realisation of the goals and
dreams of the actors themselves. The story of constitutionalism in Hong Kong
and Taiwan must therefore ultimately be told from the perspectives of the
people of Hong Kong and Taiwan and testify to their hopes and aspirations as
well as their concerns and anxieties. The story can also be told in terms of
what challenges they have faced and what they have achieved so far in re-
sponding to the challenges.
In the case of Hong Kong, the main theme of the story is how to maintain
Hong Kong's high level of civil liberties and of the rule of law as well as its
social stability and economic prosperity - all of which it had achieved by the
182 See n 127 above for the first interpretation, which was related to the right of abode.
183 The two occasions were in 2004 (interpretation on the procedure for further democratisation in
Hong Kong) and 2005 (interpretation on the term of office of the successor to Tung Chee-hwa who
resigned before completing his second term of office as Chief Executive of the HKSAR). See Chen
(n 100 above); Albert H.Y. Chen, "The NPCSC's Interpretation in Spring 2005" (2005) 35 HKLJ
255.
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early 1980s - as the people of Hong Kong confronted the uncertain prospects
of the 1997 handover. Since the 1980s, there has been in Hong Kong a dra-
matic rise in the consciousness of rights and of the importance of the rule of
law, and in the demand for democratisation and self-control of one's destiny.
Although the Basic Law was drafted mainly by mainland officials, and
although the constitutional reforms during the years of transition from 1984
to 1997 were primarily conceived of and managed by the British colonial
government of Hong Kong, the people of Hong Kong have participated
actively in both constitutional projects. They - including officials, politicians,
judges, lawyers, leaders of public opinion as well as ordinary citizens - have
also contributed much to making the Basic Law work after it came into force
in 1997. The success of the Basic Law is evidenced by the internationally
recognised high degree of autonomy, of the rule of law and of the protection
of civil liberties in Hong Kong after the handover,18 4 although Hong Kong is
not yet as democratic as Taiwan.
In the case of Taiwan, which as of the early 1980s had achieved economic
prosperity as one of the "Four Little Dragons" of East Asia but still lagged
behind Hong Kong in terms of civil liberties, the people's quests have been
for liberalisation and democratisation. As this article demonstrates, their
achievements in these regards in the last two decades have indeed been re-
markable. Within a short time span, the level of civil liberties rose to a level
comparable to that of Hong Kong, and the pace of democratisation quickly
put Taiwan far ahead of Hong Kong in terms of democratic self-rule. The
most significant achievement lies in the fact that its transition from au-
thoritarianism to democracy has been peaceful and fully in accordance with
constitutional mechanisms. The liberal democratic promises of the ROC
Constitution of 1946, though apparently broken during three and a half de-
cades of "martial law" and "mobilisation to suppress the communist rebellion",
finally materialised in the 1990s. For the first time"' in the history of Chinese
civilisation, a liberal democracy that fully recognizes human dignity and
human rights has come into existence in a Chinese society.
In section 2 of this article, the distinction between nominal, semantic and
normative constitutions has been alluded to. The operation of the Basic Law
in post-1997 Hong Kong and that of the ROC Constitution (and the Addi-
tional Articles) in Taiwan since the early 1990s suggest that they are both
normative constitutions. In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, all political actors
184 See James C. Hsiung (ed), Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China (New York: St
Martin's Press, 2000); Robert Ash et al. (eds), Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Lau Siu-kai (n 172 above); Wong Yiu-chung (ed), "One Coun-
try, Two Systems" in Crisis: Hong Kong's Transformation Since the Handover (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2004); Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So (eds), Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong (Armonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
185 See Chao and Myers (n 9 above).
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accept the norms of the constitution from the internal point of view (in H.L.A.
Hart's language) 1 6 as "rules of the game" for competition for and exercise of
political power. There is freedom to form political parties, freedom of speech
and assembly, and free and fair elections are regularly held. Constitutional
rights can be litigated in the courts of law, including the constitutional court
in the case of Taiwan. The judges who serve as constitutional interpreters in
Hong Kong and Taiwan apply progressive and international norms of consti-
tutional and human rights in their adjudication, and are well respected by the
community and the political and legal elites. These are all hallmarks of a
normative constitution at work.
The following similarities between Hong Kong and Taiwan may also be
identified. They are both Chinese societies that have experienced colonial
rule and separation from mainland China. The people of Hong Kong and
Taiwan have both developed in the course of their history a sense of identity
as "Hongkongers" ("Hong Kong people") or "Taiwanese" ("Taiwan people").
Both Hong Kong and Taiwan are now open and pluralistic societies that re-
spect human rights and the rule of law and practice constitutional government.
In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, there is a vibrant civil society and a free
press, and members of the public who are vigilant of their rights. As the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal has repeatedly said in its judgments,"I the civil
and political rights that receive constitutional protection in Hong Kong stand
at the heart of Hong Kong's separate system in "one country, two systems".
Similarly, the awareness of the existence of civil and political rights in
Taiwan also contributes to the self-identity of the people of Taiwan"' and
their sense of difference from the people of mainland China.
Thus for both Hong Kong and Taiwan, mainland China plays the role of
being "the Other". In the case of Hong Kong, the most dramatic display of
the ambivalent feeling towards the Other is the demonstration of an estim-
ated half a million people on 1 July 2003 against the proposed national security
law to implement the requirements of Article 23 of the Basic Law. In the case
of Taiwan, alienation towards the Other is expressed in the movement for
Taiwanese independence.
It is precisely the problems of how the people of Hong Kong and Taiwan
should position themselves towards this Other, and of how this Other would
view Hong Kong and Taiwan, that present the greatest challenge for the people
of Hong Kong and Taiwan in further developing the constitutionalism which
they have already achieved so far. In an important sense, the constitutional
186 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1994).
187 See, eg, Ng Ka Ling (n 127 above); Ng Kung Siu (n 87 above); Bahadur (n 87 above); Yeung May-wan
(n 159 above).
188 See Long Yingtai (16)ft), Please Persuade Me By Civilisation (01flifWO1ER-A) (Hong Kong:
Tandi tushu, 2006).
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projects in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are still works in progress that await
completion. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan are constitutional systems in tran-
sition. In the case of Hong Kong, the ultimate goal is defined in the Basic Law
itself, which is universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive and
of all legislators. In the case of Taiwan, the transitional nature of the existing
constitutionalism is evidenced in the text of the ROC Constitution that is in
force in Taiwan subject to the Additional Articles. This constitutional text
makes it clear that it is a constitution of and for China as a whole. How the
people and government of present-day Taiwan relate to the people and gov-
ernment of China as a whole remains unresolved in the ROC Constitution
that has long lost its force in mainland China but is still valid in Taiwan. The
question cannot be resolved without the two governments putting aside their
differences and negotiating a solution in the form of a new constitutional
arrangement that transcends the conflicting texts of both the existing Con-
stitution of the PRC and the ROC Constitution. When that happens, the
experiment of Chinese constitutionalism that began in Hong Kong and Tai-
wan in the last two decades will have reached the pinnacle of its achievement.
For in the final analysis, constitutionalism is a human invention for peaceful
co-existence and the peaceful resolution of political conflict.
(2007) HKLJ
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